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ABSTRACT 
Network flow is an area of optimization theory concerned with optimization over 
networks with a range of applicability in fields such as computer networks, manufac-
turing, finance, scheduling and routing, telecommunications, and transportation. In 
both linear and nonlinear networks, a family of primal-dual algorithms based on "ap-
proximate" Complementary Slackness ( c-CS) is among the fastest in centralized and 
distributed environments. These include the auction algorithm for the linear assign-
ment/transportation problems, €-relaxation and Auction/Sequential Shortest Path 
(ASSP) for the min-cost flow and max-flow problems. Within this family, the auction 
algorithm is particularly fast, as it uses "second best" information, as compared to 
using the more generic €-relaxation for linear assignment/transportation. 
Inspired by the success of auction algorithms, we extend them to two important 
classes of nonlinear network flow problems. We start with the nonlinear Resource 
Allocation Problem (RAP). This problem consists of optimally assigning N divisi-
ble resources toM competing missions/tasks each with its own utility function. This 
simple yet powerful framework has found applications in diverse fields such as finance, 
v 
economics, logistics, sensor and wireless networks. RAP is an instance of generalized 
network (networks with arc gains) flow problem but it has significant special structure 
analogous to the assignment/transportation problem. We develop a class of auction 
algorithms for RAP: a finite-time auction algorithm for both synchronous and asyn-
chronous environments followed by a combination of forward and reverse auction with 
E-scaling to achieve pseudo polynomial complexity for any non-increasing generalized 
convex utilities including non-continuous and/ or non-differentiable functions. These 
techniques are then generalized to handle shipping costs on allocations. Lastly, we 
demonstrate how these techniques can be used for solving a dynamic RAP where 
nodes may appear or disappear over time. 
In later part of the thesis, we consider the convex nonlinear min-cost flow problem. 
Although E-relaxation and ASSP are among the fastest available techniques here, we 
illustrate how nonlinear costs, as opposed to linear, introduce a significant bottleneck 
on the progress that these algorithms make per iteration. We then extend the core 
idea of the auction algorithm, use of second best to make aggressive steps, to over-
come this bottleneck and hence develop a faster version of E-relaxation. This new 
algorithm shares the same theoretical complexity as the original but outperforms it 
in our numerical experiments based on random test problem suites. 
vi 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 
This thesis is concerned with optimization problems which can be formulated as a 
minimization of separable, nonlinear and convex functions over network constraints. 
Such problems arise a very wide range of applications such as computer networks, 
telecommunications, engineering, finance and operations research. Specifically we 
consider two classes of problems: 
Nonlinear Resource Allocation Problem: 
Nonlinear Resource Allocation Problems (RAP) are a class of optimization problems 
where heterogeneous resources have to be allocated to a diverse set of tasks. The 
underlying performance of executing a task is a nonlinear function of the bundle of 
resources assigned to it. Interest in RAP is motivated by diverse applications such 
as in search theory [Koopman, 1957, Charnes and Cooper, 1958, Washburn, 1995], 
weapon target assignment [Washburn, 1994, Ahuja et al., 2007], sensor management, 
market equilibria [Devanur et al., 2008) , production planning [Ibaraki and Katoh, 
1988, Patriksson, 2008), scheduling of mass screening tests [Lee and Pierskalla, 1988) 
and allocation of software-testing resources [Ohtera and Yamada, 1990). The linear 
cost generalized assignment [Bertsekas, 1998] and transportation [Censor and Zenios, 
1997) problems can be seen as special cases of these problems. 
Nonlinear Minimum Cost (min-cost) Flow: 
Network flow problems with network constraints and convex arc. costs arise in a variety 
of applications, such as power distribution in hydroelectric power systems [Rosenthal, 
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1981], pipe flow analysis (Keady, 1987], data communications (Gallager, 1977], trans-
portation networks (Florian, 1986], and finance (Mulvey, 1987]. In such problems, the 
overall performance is a separable function of the flows on each arc, and the feasi-
ble flows are constrained by conservation of flow and network topology. Also many 
network optimization problems like the transportation problem, the assignment prob-
lem,and the shortest path problem can be formulated as special cases of the minimum 
cost network flow. 
In both linear and nonlinear networks, a family of primal-dual algorithms based 
on E-Complementary Slackness (E-CS) is among the fastest in centralized and dis-
tributed environments. These algorithms are approximate primal dual techniques 
based on dual coordinate ascent methods. Unlike primal dual techniques, they only 
maintain approximate complementary slackness (CS), called E-CS, as opposed to CS. 
Their dual coordinate ascent nature makes them good candidates for distributed 
implementation. This family includes the auction algorithm for the linear assign-
ment/transportation problems (Bertsekas, 1992, Bertsekas and Castanon, 1989], E-
relaxation and Auction/Sequential Shortest Path (ASSP) for the min-cost flow and 
max-flow problems [Bertsekas and Eckstein, 1988, Bertsekas et al., 1997, Tseng and 
Bertsekas, 2000]. Within this family, the auction algorithm is particularly fast , as it 
uses "second best" information, as compared to using the more generic E-relaxation 
for linear assignment/transportation. 
Inspired by the success of auction algorithms in linear networks, this thesis devel-
ops auction algorithms for nonlinear networks. 
1.1 Main Contributions 
In this section we outline the main contributions of this thesis. Details about related 
previous work are given in the relevant chapters. The theory and results of chapters 3, 
3 
4 and 7 correspond to the papers [Bangia and Castanon, 2010, Bangia and Castanon, 
2011b, Bangia and Castanon, 2011a, Bangia and Castanon, 2012], respectively. 
1.1.1 Auction Algorithms for RAP 
Our contributions here are illustrated in Figure 1·1. We have used the principles of 
auction algorithm to propose a class of algorithms for solving the resource allocation 
problem. 
Generalized Nonlinear Networks I Auction Algorithms / 
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Figure 1·1: Hierarchy of network optimization problems. RAP shares 
the underlying bipartite graph structure to linear problems such as 
assignment and transportation where the Auction Algorithm has been 
very successful. With Auction as motivation, we have developed three 
new algorithms for solving RAP. 
RAP Auction 
From first principles we derive a new auction algorithm for the RAP in chapter 3. 
This algorithm exploits the unique graph structure present in RAPs combining ideas 
from convex and combinatorial optimization. Unlike most existing algorithms for this 
class of problems, this algorithm works for all convex monotonic utilities including 
non-differentiable and non-strictly convex functions. We establish finite convergence 
for this algorithm. 
Distributed RAP Auction 
4 
In a distributed framework, we consider the problem as one in which a set of au-
tonomous agents with resources collaborate to reach globally optimal allocation of 
their resources to a set of tasks. In spite of limited, unreliable, delayed communica-
tion or memory access capabilities and with no or minimum coordination, algorithms 
must converge. RAP Auction has a very simple and separable computation structure 
which makes it a natural candidate for distributed implementation. In Chapter 4, we 
propose a totally asynchronous implementation of RAP Auction for distributed RAP 
and prove its convergence. 
Polynomial RAP Auction 
In Chapter 5, we illustrate why RAP Auction cannot have stronger guarantees than 
finite convergence due to cycles. We propose a modified version of RAP Auction 
called forward auction which rectifies these issues. In the forward auction sources 
with surplus (non negative) allocate to sinks. We can consider the opposite paradigm, 
reverse auction, where source with deficits (negative surplus) withdraw from sinks. 
Not only is this algorithmically interesting, it is essential for implementing E-scaling, a 
powerful technique for achieving pseudo polynomial complexity as well as accelerating 
the emperical performance. These new algorithms: forward and reverse auction along 
with E-scaling for RAP are developed in Chapter 5. After establishing the theoretical 
bounds, we demonstrate the vastly superior empirical performance of our algorithm 
on a wide range of randomly generated search problems. 
Generalized and Dynamic RAP 
In chapter 6, we explore the impact of introducing shipping costs on arcs and propose 
necessary modifications to all our proposed techniques: RAP Auction, Distributed 
RAP Auction and Polynomial RAP Auction. 
5 
In this chapter, we also explore a dynamic version of RAP where we allow arrival 
and departure of new nodes and edges making the network topology dynamic. As 
opposed to restarting optimization from scratch, we show how forward and reverse 
auction can be used to adapt existing solutions to dynamic network changes. 
1.1.2 Auction algorithms for nonlinear min-cost flow 
Some fast algorithms and their historic evolution is illustrated in Figure 1·2. Algo-
Problems 
Assignment Linear Nonlinear 
Transportation Min-Cost Flow Min-Cost Flow 
Algorithms ) •-Relmtion) Accelerated Auction e-Relaxation {State of Art) e-Re laxation 
Key ideas 
E-CS > ) ) E-CS E-CS E-CS Sec best info Sec best info 
Figure 1·2: Fast algorithms for different network flow problems. The 
evolution of these algorithms is from left to right starting from the auc-
tion algorithm which introduced two new concepts: E-CS and use of sec-
ond best information. However E-Relaxation does not use second best 
information. We propose a new algorithm, Accelerated E-Relaxation, 
which reintroduces the use of second best information to outperform 
E-Relaxation. 
rithms based onE-relaxation and auction/sequential shortest path algorithms (ASSP) 
are among the fastest techniques for solving both linear and nonlinear min-cost flow 
problems. These algorithms are based on the notion of E-CS which was first proposed 
in the auction algorithm for linear assignment/transportation problems. Another new 
idea, the use of second best information for aggressive steps, which was also intro-
duced in the auction algorithm was not found to be relevant in linear min-cost flow 
problem and subsequently was not pursued either in the nonlinear networks. However, 
6 
in chapter 7, we analyze the qualitative behavior of €-Relaxation for nonlinear costs 
and identify situations which can slow down the algorithm considerably because it is 
forced to take very small steps in approaching an optimal solution. This behavior is 
unique to the nonlinear version, and is not present when the costs are linear. We then 
propose a modification to overcome these situations using concepts inspired by the 
auction algorithm. Like auction, our improved algorithm, accelerated €-relaxation, 
uses the second best price/information to take aggressive steps. We show that this 
algorithm has same the computational complexity as the original €-relaxation algo-
rithm. Our empirical simulations in solving large numbers of random problems show 
that the our algorithm outperforms the original algorithm. 
7 
Chapter 2 
Resource Allocation Problem 
In this chapter, we will formulate and motivate the Resource Allocation Problem 
(RAP). We also derive the dual problem and review the relevant literature. 
2.1 Problem Formulation 
RAP was originally formulated by the operations research community [Mjelde, 1983b, 
lbaraki and Katoh, 1988]. Let (W, 7, £) be a bipartite graph. We use the following 
notation: 
• N = IWI, number of sources, 
• M = 171, number of sinks, 
• A= 1£1, number of arcs, 
• si E R+: Quantity of resource at ith source, 
• Xij E R+: Quantity of resource assigned to lh sink by ith source, 
• Cij E R+: Gain on arc (i,j) E £, 
• aii E R+: Shipment cost on arc (i,j) E £ , 
• Wi = {i: (i,j) E £}: Sources connected to lh sink, 
• 1i = {j : (i, j) E £}: Sinks connected to ith source, 
8 
• fi : R+ -t R+: Cost function for the jth sink which is assumed to be non-
increasing convex function. 
Then RAP can be formulated as: 
Generalized RAP: 
f* = mJn f(x) 6 I: /j (2: cijXij) + I: aijXij 
jET iEWj {i,j}E£ 
(2.1a) 
S.t. I: Xij :::; Si \:;1 i E W (2.lb) 
jET;. 
x2::0 (2.lc) 
We call this formulation as Generalized RAP to distinguish it from a popular variant 
in which shipping costs are zeros and constraint (2.1b) is replaced with an equality 
constraint. Henceforth, this variant is referred to as Equality RAP as opposed to 
Generalized RAP. The structure of the general problem is as follows (see Fig 2·1). 
The sink nodes can be seen as different tasks or missions competing for the resources 
of the source nodes with the objective of minimizing the overall cost. The arc gains 
Cij model the effectiveness of assigning a particular resource to a task while aij is the 
shipping cost. The constraints are linear and half of the network has trivially linear 
(zero) cost functions. The nonlinearity is present only at the sink nodes. In essence 
RAP is a bipartite matching problem. While the traditional matching problem such 
as the Linear Assignment Problem (LAP) is one-to-one matching, RAP is many-to-
many. 
9 
Resources/Sources Tasks/Sinks 
c11 fl(zl) 
Linear Part 
Nonlinear Part 
I I 
Figure 2·1: Multi resource allocation problem. 
Trivially Generalized RAP can also be formulated as 
min L fi(zj) + L aijXij {x,z} jET {i,j}E£ 
s.t. L Xij ::; si 
jE7i 
L CijXij D. Zj 
iEWj 
X~ 0 , Z ~ 0 
where z is the demand met for the tasks. 
ViEW 
V jET 
(2.2a) 
(2.2b) 
(2.2c) 
(2.2d) 
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2.2 Motivation 
This simple yet versatile formulation -captures many fundamental problems in diverse 
areas. Here we give a few detailed applications which fit the framework of RAP. 
2.2.1 Search Theory [Washburn, 1995] 
Suppose that an object is in an unknown location in one of the M regions each of 
area Ai as shown in Figure 2·2. Let Pi be the prior probability of being in region j 
Figure 2 · 2: Detection of target. 
and vi the reward for finding the target in region j. Limited amount of search effort 
is available in form of N distinct types of resources each with si units of resource. 
Assume further that the amount of area swept per unit effort by a searcher of type 
i in regions j is Cij. If Xij is the allocation, then the total area swept in region j is 
Li cijXij. If the search in each regions is random, then the law of detection has the 
exponential-saturation form [Koopman, 1956, Koopman, 1957], i.e., the probability 
of no detection is exp(- Li cijXij/Ai)· Now the problem of optimum distribution of 
11 
the available searching effort can be formulated as 
S.t. 2::: Xij = Si 
jETi 
x~O 
where we redefine Cij t:>. Cij / Ai. 
2.2.2 Weapon-Target Assignment 
\fiE W 
Consider the problem of allocation of different type weapons to targets so as to 
minimize the probably of a miss. Let Pij be the probability of detection or kill when 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Figure 2·3: Sensors as providers of service and targets as jobs. 
' 
' 
a unit of resource from ith sensor is allocated to lh mission. So probability of a miss 
if Xij amount of resource is allocated is (1 - Pij Yii. Let vi E )R+ be the relative 
importance weighting coefficients. 
s.t. L Xij = si 
jET; 
x2::0 
12 
V i E W (Capacity constraint) 
(Reach-ability constraints) 
Define Cij 6 -ln(1- Pij)· Then this problem is equivalent to 
mJn L vie- l:iewi Ci jXij 
jET 
s.t. LXij = si 
jET; 
ViEW 
WTA is usually formulated with integer constraints which makes it NP hard [Lloyd 
and Witsenhausen, 1986]. In such as case, the continuous WTA is useful for lower-
bounding in branch-and-bound for solving integer WTA [Ahuja et al., 2007]. 
2.2.3 Market Equilibria [Vazirani, 2008] 
A central tenet in market pricing mechanisms is that prices be such that demand 
equals supply. The search for efficient algorithms for computing market equilibria 
started with much interest within theoretical computer science about a decade ago. 
The goal was not only academic, i.e., providing an algorithmic ratification of Adam 
Smith's "invisible hand of the market", but was also motivated by potential applica-
tions to the plethora of new and highly lucrative markets that have emerged on the 
Internet such as the Adwords markets where advertisers bid for search queries. Two 
fundamental market models are: 
13 
Fisher's Market Model 
Consider a market consisting of a set T of buyers and a set W of divisible goods. 
Each buyer j has ej amount of money and for each good i amount si is available. Let 
cij be the utility derived by j on obtaining a unit of good j. Thus if the buyer j is 
given Xij units of different goods, then his happiness is 
Zi !.>. L CijXij· 
jET 
Prices p 1 , ... ,PN of the goods are said to be market clearing prices if, after each 
buyer is assigned optimal basket of goods relative to these prices, there is no surplus 
or deficiency of any of the goods. The task is to compute such prices. It turns out 
that equilibrium allocations for Fisher's Linear case are captured as optimal solutions 
to the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. 
m;x L ej log(zj) 
jET 
s.t. L Xij :S si 
jET 
LCijXij = Zj 
iEW 
x2:::0 
\1 i E W 
\1 jET 
The Langrange multipliers for the constraints LjET X i j < si can be interpreted as 
the prices of goods. 
Arrow-Debreu/Exchange Model 
This differs from the Fisher's Model in that the buyers come to the market not with 
money but with an initial endowment of goods, ej = { eil, ei2 , ... , eiN }. This can be 
viewed as a Nash bargaining game as follows . For each j E 7 , let dj denoted the 
14 
--'~ ~ ~- ·~ ~~\..!? ' ' ~) ' ' . . 
. ' "' 
Figure 2·4: Fisher's Market Model. 
happiness derived by buyer i for his initial endowment i.e., 
dj = 2:..:: cijeij. 
iEW 
Then dis a disagreement point. It is the happiness of each buyer if they don't trade 
goods with each other. Now the Nash bargaining game is defined as 
where 
m:x IT ( zj - dj) 
jET 
S.t. 2:..:: Xij :::; Si 
jET 
2:..:: Cij Xij = Zj 
iEW 
x~O 
si = 2:..:: eij . 
jET 
\fiE W 
\f jET 
This is equivalent to 
max Llog(zj- dj) 
X jET 
s.t. L Xij :::; si 
jET 
L CijXij = Zj 
iEW 
x~O 
15 
\1 i E W 
\1 jET 
2.2.4 Throughput Allocation on a Wireless Channel 
A central throughput allocation problem arising in the context of a wireless channel, 
such as in 3G technologies, is the following. There are M users and the wireless 
router can be in any of N different states whose probabilities, si, can be estimated 
by sampling. Each user j derives utility at rate Cij if it is connected to the router 
while the router is in state i. No matter what state the router is in, only one user can 
be connected to it. If user j is given connection for Xij :::; si of the time the router 
is in state i , for 1 :::; i :::; N, then the total utility derived by j is Zj = '2:~1 Cij Xij· 
Clearly, we must ensure the constraint l:_f=1 X ij :::; si, for each j. The question is to 
find a "fair" way of dividing the s i s among the users. The method of choice in the 
networking community is to use Kelly's proportional fair scheme (Kelly, 1997), which 
entails maximizing '2:~1 log Zj subject to the constraints given previously, that is, 
solving the Eisenberg Gale convex program. Observe that this setting can be viewed 
as a linear Fisher market with M users and N divisible goods. However, this solution 
may at times allocate unacceptably low utility to certain users. This was countered 
by giving users the ability to put a lower bound on channel rates, say Cj for user j . 
This enhanced problem was solved by changing the objective function of the convex 
program to maximizing '2:~1 log(zj - cj); observe that this is precisely an instance 
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of Arrow-Debreu Nash Bargaining Game! 
2.2.5 Production planning [Ibaraki and Katoh, 1988, Patriksson, 2008] 
Production resources such as labour hours, machine hours and warehouse storage 
space need to be allocated to each item being produced so as to minimize the total 
production costs. One standard problem is the Lot Sizing Problem 
N 
mJn L ci/xi + bjXj 
j=l 
N 
s.t. L ajXj ::; b 
j=l 
x~O 
where for each item j , Xj is its lot size, Cj the ordering cost per order, bj the holding 
cost per item, aj the storage requirement per item and b the storage cost. Rescaling 
Xj as ajXj leads to 
~c·a · b· 
min L......t _]__]_ + 2 x j 
x x · a· j=l J J 
N 
s.t . L Xj ::; b 
j=l 
x~O 
This is RAP with single resource i.e., N = 1 
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2.2.6 Special Cases 
Several problems can be seen as special cases of RAP. With 
0:=1 
RAP is equivalent to 
m;x L aijXij 
{i,j}EE 
s.t. LXij ~ 1 
jET; 
L CijXij ~ dj 
iEWj 
\fiE W 
'v'(i, j) E £ 
\f jET 
\fiE W 
\f jET 
With the additional assumption that for every i E W there exists atleast a J E 
1i : aij > 0 & Cij > 0, this is equivalent to the linear Generalized Assignment 
problem [Bertsekas, 1998] 
m;x L aijXij 
{i,j}EE 
s.t. L:xij = 1 
jET; 
L CijXij = dj 
iEWj 
\fiE W 
\f jET 
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Similarly the Generalized Transportation problem (Censor and Zenios, 1997] can be 
shown to be a special case of RAP. 
2.3 Duality 
Introducing Lagrange multipliers f..Li E R+ and Pi E lR for the flow conservation 
constraints at the source Wand sink T nodes, respectively, we get the dual of RAP 
as 
max q(JL, p) 
1-'~0 ,p 
where the dual function q: RN+M r--t (-oo, oo) is given by 
q(p, , P) = ~ Qj(JLwj , Pi) - p,'s 
jET 
and qi : RIWil+l r--t (-oo, oo) is defined as 
It is easy to see that q is not continuously differentiable as 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
RAP is an instance of a class of convex programs called as Monotropic program-
ming. Since it is always (primal) feasible, strong duality (Proposition 9.19. in (Bert-
sekas, 1998]) holds, i.e. , 
!* = q* 
where f* and q* are the optimal primal and dual cost, respectively. 
We say that a flow-demand vector pair ( x , z) and a price vector pair (JL, p) satisfy 
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Complementary Slackness (CS) if x;:::: 0, z;:::: 0, J.-t ;:::: 0, and 
f.-li = CijPj - aij V { i, j} E t: with Xij > 0 
f.-li = 0 V i with L Xij < si 
jE~ 
(2.5a) 
(2.5b) 
(2.5c) 
(2.5d) 
where ofi(zi) is the subdifferential (set of all subgradients) of fi at Zj. For a scalar 
convex function of a scalar variable 
where fj- ( Zj) and f/ ( Zj) are the left derivative and right derivative of fi at Zj, re-
spectively. (2.5c) is equivalent to 
(2.6) 
where Qj is the conjugate function [Tseng and Bertsekas, 1990] of fj, 
iii(>.)= sup{>.T -fi(T)} V).. E R+. (2.7) 
T2':0 
From the properties of conjugate functions [Bertsekas, 1998] 
and [Tseng and Bertsekas, 1990] 
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We can implicitly define J-L as 
\I i E W (2.9) 
where [ciiPi- aij]+ = max{ciiPi- aij, 0}. Now we say the triple (x, z, p) satisfies CS 
if x ~ 0, z ~ 0, and 
\f jET 
\I i with L Xij < si. 
jET; 
(2.10a) 
(2.10b) 
(2.10c) 
This can be broken down in three conditions one each related to the arcs, sinks and 
sources: 
• The flow-price pair (x, p) satisfies CSarc if x ~ 0 and (2.10a) holds. This is 
illustrated in Fig. 2.5(a). 
• The demand-price pair (z, p) satisfies CSsink if z ~ 0 and (2.10b) holds. This is 
shown in Fig. 2.5(b). 
• The flow-price pair (x,p) satisfies CSsrc if (2.10c) holds. 
Now the triple (x, z, p) satisfies CS if and only if (iff) (x, p) satisfies CSarc and CSsrc 
while (z, p) satisfies CSsink, respectively. We say that the pair (x, p) satisfies CS if 
demand, z, is assumed to be implicitly defined by (2.2c) for a given x and the triple 
(x, z, p) satisfies CS. A flow vector, x, is said to be primal feasible it satisfies (2.1b) 
and (2.1c) while the pair (x, z) is primal feasible if it satisfies (2.2b) and (2.2c), and 
(2.2d). 
The Complementary Slackness Theorem (Proposition 9.17. in [Bertsekas, 1998]) 
holds for RAP 
lli ....,_ ___ _ 
X·. 1] 
(a) CSarc 
p· J 
21 
-at. J 
(b) CSsink 
Z· J 
(c) Cost Function 
Figure 2·5: Illustration of CS. (a) All pairs of arc flows Xij and cijPj 
should lie on the blue line, (b) All pairs of demand Zj and price Pj 
should lie on the blue line and (c) Sample cost function for which (b) 
is derived. 
Proposition 2.1 A primal f easible flow x * and a price vector p* satisfy CS if and 
only if x * and p* are optimal primal and dual solutions, respectively, and 
f(z*) = q(J-L*, p*) 
where z* and J-L* are implicitly defined from x* and p* using (2.2c) and (2.9), respec-
tively. 
Sufficient condition for the existence of a price vector which satisfies CS together 
with the optimal flow vector is the existence of at least one regular primal feasible 
solution (Proposition 9.18. in [Bertsekas, 1998]) where a flow vector xis called regular 
if for the corresponding demand z (from Eq. (2.2c)), we have 
The following lemma shows that this is always true for RAP. 
Lemma 2.1 RAP always has at least one primal f easible solution that is regular. 
Proof: From convexity, we have the following monotonicity [Bertsekas, 1998] 
(2.11) 
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and monotonicity of cost functions implies 
lim ff(T) :::; 0. 
T-+00 
So if ff(O) > -oo, then any non-negative demand is regular. Hence any feasible 
demand is also regular. However if ff(O) = -oo, then any positive demand is regular 
as fi- may equal -oo only at the left endpoint of its domain. So 
(2.12) 
We say a RAP is well defined if all sources have strictly positive supply and each 
sink is connected to at least one source. If a RAP is not well defined then it can be 
reduced to a well defined problem by eliminating the irrelevant nodes, sources with 
zero supply and isolated sinks . . For a well defined RAP, there always exists a feasible 
solution for which demand is positive. So there exists at least one regular feasible 
solution. • 
Corollary 2.1 Sufficient condition for the existence of a real price vector, p E R+ 
which satisfies CSsink together with a given non-negative demand, z > 0, is 
ff(O) > -oo V j E T. 
Proof: For CSsink, the demand-price pair has to satisfy (2.10b). For positive 
demands, z > 0, (2.12) implies that such a price vector exists. However if Zj = 0 and 
ff(O) = -oo, then Pi = oo. • 
2.4 Related work 
The history of resource allocation problems dates back to the paper by Koopman 
[Koopman, 1953], in which he considered the problem of a distribution of effort (single 
resource) to two activities. Since then single resource allocation problem ( SRAP) has 
23 
become a widely studied problem [Patriksson, 2008, Ibaraki and Katoh, 1988]. 
2.4.1 Algorithms for SRAP 
In this problem a single resource N = 1 has to be allocated to different competing task. 
The dual of SRAP has a particularly simple form with a single Lagrange multiplier 
and be can be solved through line search. Generalized methods such as bisection 
search or grid search can be used but specialized algorithms have been proposed 
which utilize the structure of SRAP. 
Primal SRAP 
minx ~jET fi(xj) 
S.t. ~jETXj = S 
x~O 
Ranking Algorithms 
Dual SRAP 
maxJ.L q({l) 
where 
q(ft) 6 minx ~jET (jj(Xj) + {LXj)- {LS 
Charnes and Cooper [Charnes and Cooper, 1958] and Wilkinson and Gupta [Wilkin-
son and Gupta, 1969] present algorithms to solve SRAP for exponentially decreasing 
performance functions. Luss and Gupta [Luss and Gupta, 1975] generalized to perfor-
mance functions which are strictly convex, decreasing and continuously differentiable. 
All these algorithms are based on ranking the activities according to the derivatives 
of the functions fj 's evaluated at the origin or lower bound. Their algorithm is es-
pecially efficient for certain classes of performance functions such as exponentials, 
quadratic, logarithmic for which the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint 
can be expressed as a closed-form expression. Einbu [Einbu, 1981] extended their 
algorithm to handle performance functions for which the derivative functions of fi 's 
may not be explicitly invertible by using a numerical method for solving problems. 
We collectively refer to these algorithms as ranking algorithms. 
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Relaxation Algorithms 
Bitran and Hax [Bitran and Hax, 1981] present a relaxation-based algorithm which 
can handle convex (instead of strictly convex) performance functions. They solve 
the primal SRAP by relaxing the non-negativity constraints which makes it slightly 
simpler problem. If the optimal solution to the relaxed problem is non-negative, 
then this is also an optimal solution to SRAP. If not, then peg the non-positive 
allocations to zero and re-solve the reduced relaxed problem (without tasks for which 
the allocations have been fixed). The relaxed SRAPs can be solved quite simply from 
the KKT conditions if the derivatives of fi 's are invertible. Since in each iteration at 
least one variable is fixed (or, pegged, as it is sometimes called) to an optimal value, 
the algorithm is clearly finite. 
2.4.2 Algorithms for RAP 
Einbu [Einbu, 1978] and Mjelde [Mjelde, 1977,Mjelde, 1983b] studied the properties of 
set of optimal allocations for the Equality RAP. The most significant result is related 
to the existence of acyclic optimal solutions. For any feasible x to RAP one can form 
an associated undirected bipartite graph G with M + N nodes and an edge (i, j) iff 
Xij > 0. If G has no cycles, then we say x is acyclic. In the following proposition we 
summarize their results and generalize them for Generalized RAP. 
Proposition 2.2 Let X* denote the optimal solution set of Generalized RAP. For 
any allocation x EX*, define demand vector z by (2.2c). Then we have the following 
properties: 
1. X* is non empty and compact. 
2. For a= 0 (Zero shipment costs), 
(a) X* ::2 X*, where X* is the optimal solution set for Equality RAP. If fi 's 
are strictly convex, then X* = X*. 
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(b) :J x E X* with at most N + M - 1 non-zero allocations z.e., llxllo < 
N+M-1. 
(c) If fi 's are strictly convex then z* is uniquely determined i.e., V x E X* 
LiEWj CijXij = zj V jET. 
(d) :J x E X* which is acyclic and sparsest. 
3. For a> 0 (non-zero shipment costs), 
(a) :J x EX* with at most N + M non-zero allocations i.e., llxll 0 :::; N + M. 
(b) If fi 's are strictly convex then z*, a0 are uniquely determined i.e., V x E X*, 
L{i,j}EE aijXij = ao and LiEWj CijXij = zj V jET. 
Proof: 
1. The feasible set of Problem (2.1) is compact. By Weierstrass' theorem, X* is 
non empty and compact. 
2. (a) X* ;::2 X* trivially follows from the non-increasing assumption on fj's. 
Strictly convexity with monotonicity implies strict monotonicty. So X* = 
X*. 
(b) Given any optimal solution, x*, we can recover such a sparse optimal 
solution by solving the following LP 
m;x L cilxil 
iEW1 
s.t. LXij = si ViEW 
jET. (2.13) 
L CijXij = L Cijx:j V j E T\1 
iEWj iEWj 
x~O 
This program has N + M -1 constraints and hence has an optimal solution, 
x with at most N + M- 1 non-zero allocations. Now z ~ z*. As fi's 
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are non-increasing, we have x E X*. For more detailed explanation see 
Theorem 4.1-2 in (Mjelde, 1983b]. 
(c) Strict convexity implies uniqueness of the optimal solution ( c.f. Theorem 
4.3 in [Mjelde, 1983b]). 
(d) Let x* E X* be the sparest solution and assume that it is cyclic. Then it 
has at least one simple cycle, C such that V(i, j) E C, xii > 0. Let we and 
ye denote source and sink nodes in C, respectively. For some j' E ye, 
consider the following LP 
s.t. L Xij = L x7i 
jETf jE'T;_c 
L CijXij = L CijX7j \::1 j E P\j' 
iEWf iEWf 
x;:::o 
From the bipartite structure of G, we have #We= #Te = L(say). So this 
is an LP with 2£ variables and 2£- 1 constraints. Hence there is a optimal 
basic solution, say xe, with at least one variable 0 i.e., llxello < llx*ello· 
Define 
x = {X~ ll ( z, J) E C 
xij 1f ( z, J) ¢:. C 
It follows that x E X* and llxllo < llx* llo which is a contradiction. This 
proof has proposed in (Washburn, 1995]. 
3. (a) Given any optimal solution, x*, we can be recover such a sparse optimal 
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solution by solving the following linear program 
m:x L cilxil 
iEW1 
s.t. L Xij :=:; si 
jE7i 
L CijXij = L ciix;i 
iEWj iEWj 
L aijXij = L aijx;i 
{ i,j}Et' { i,j}Et' 
x~O 
\1 i E W 
\1 j E T\1 
(b) Strict convexity implies uniqueness of z/s such that LjETfi(zi) = f*-a0, 
where f* is the optimal cost. 
• 
Resource-Wise Optimization Algorithm 
In their paper [Luss and Gupta, 1975] on SRAP, Luss and Gupta consider RAP as an 
extension of SRAP and propose a method called resource-wise optimization algorithm 
(RWOA) where in each iteration, say k, all resource constraints but one, say i are 
relaxed while keeping the allocation of relaxed resources fixed. This relaxed problem 
is an SRAP. 
SRAP(i;xt- 1): min 
{Xi x'Ji ,z} 
s.t. 
L {fi(zi ) + aijXij} 
jE7i 
'"""'X ·· < S· ~ t)- t 
jE7i 
CijXij + L CtjXfj1 = Zj 
lEWj\i 
\1 jET 
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This is a primal block co-ordinate descent and hence converges to an optimal so-
lution as iterations go to infinity for continuously differentiable and strictly convex 
decreasing objective functions. 
Primal Simplex Type Algorithm 
Einbu draws parallels between the Transportation problem and RAP. Also RAP can 
be viewed as a problem in generalized network (network with gains). In such networks 
augmented forests rather than spanning trees form the basis for the basic solutions 
[Ahuja, 1993). Equality RAP has a special structure i.e the presence of unique cycle 
free optimal solution as shown in proposition 2.2. Based on this property, Einbu 
[Einbu, 1984, Einbu, 1985) and Washburn [Washburn, 1995) propose a simplex type 
algorithm for the primal problem with finite termination property. 
Other Methods 
Mjelde [Mjelde, 1982, Mjelde, 1983a) proposed a finite algorithm for the allocation of 
resources to concave activities. This algorithm runs in polynomial time for problems 
with an exponential, quadratic, or logarithmic objective function , when the ellipsoid 
method is used [Mjelde, 1983a). 
General-purpose convex optimization routines such as MINOS [Murtagh and Saun-
ders,] or GRG [Lasdon et al., 1978) can also be used to solve RAP. Both these methods 
are based on reduced gradient method using quasi-Newton updates. These routines 
have been used by different authors as a benchmark for their algorithms. 
2.4.3 Dual Ascent Techniques 
The dual of RAP is a convex program with simple positive orthant constraints. The 
dual problem (2.3) is unconstrained (it has trivial non-negative constraints) but non-
differentiable. So subgradient based methods [Bertsekas et al., 2003) such as subgra-
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dient ascent, cutting plane, E-ascent and bundle methods can be employed. 
Subgradient Ascent 
By dualizing primal problem (2.2), rather than (2.1) we get a smaller dual problem. 
Here we have Langrange multipliers J-Li only for the conservation of flow constraints 
at the source nodes. 
L(x,J.L) 
q(J.L) 
The dual problem is 
minL(x, J.L) 
xEX 
sup q(J.L) 
,.,.~o 
An iteration of subgradient ascent with step size sequence {at} looks like 
• 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
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where 
dt = 2: d~ E 8q(J-Lt) = 2: 8Qj(J-Ltvi). 
jEW jEW 
By Danskin's Theorem, 
where 
We can use Randomized Incremental Subgradient Methods [Bertsekas et al., 2003] 
which converge faster. 
Unlike the gradient methods, subgradient methods with constant step size may 
not converge at all while the convergence for diminishing step size is asymptotic. In 
practice the ascent algorithm is stopped after a finite number of iterations with a near 
optimal price vector J.L with corresponding flow vector x which might not be feasible. 
So we are still left with the problem of computing a near-optimal feasible allocation. 
More formally this problem can be stated as 
Given a sequence of price vectors {J-Lt}f=1 and the corresponding flows { xt}f=1 gen-
erated during the iterations of subgradient ascent, how to generate the most optimal 
feasible solution ? 
[Nedic and Ozdaglar, 2009] proposes a scheme based simply on averaging {xt}f=I· 
This scheme was proposed for generic convex problems and hence doesn't exploit 
special structure in RAP. Also the generated solution is always non-feasible but the 
constraint violation is bounded by 0(1/T). 
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2.4.4 Network Optimization 
As noted by Enibu, RAP is a problem in generalized networks. Network optimization 
is a highly successfully area in optimization theory. Linear network problems such 
as assignment , transportation, shortest path, max-flow, and min-cost flow problems 
being special cases of linear programming problems, can be solved in polynomial 
time using algorithms such as Ellipsoid or Karmarkar's methods. However, pursuit of 
specialized algorithms exploiting the underlying graph structure, has resulted in the 
development of very rich theory and highly efficient algorithms such as primal sim-
plex, dual simplex, dual ascent, relaxation method, auction, <:-relaxation [Bertsekas, 
1998] and preflow push [Goldberg, 1987, Goldberg and Tarjan, 1990]. One of the 
most powerful ideas in linear networks is c-CS. This has lead to some of the fastest 
polynomial-time algorithms such as auction of assignment and transportation [Bert-
sekas, 1992,Bertsekas and Castanon, 1989], <:-relaxation and auction/sequential short-
est path algorithms (ASSP) for max-flow and min-cost [Bertsekas and Eckstein, 1988]. 
Not only are they computation efficient, they are highly parallelizable or amenable to 
distributed implementations. We collectively refer this family of algorithms as c-CS 
techniques. 
The spectacular success in linear networks has been extended for nonlinear ordi-
nary network problems. Again, algorithms based on <:-relaxation and auction sequen-
tial shortest path algorithms (ASSP) are among the fastest techniques for solving 
nonlinear network flow problems [Bertsekas et al., 1997]. Apart from their speed, 
they also work for non-differentiable or/ and non-strictly convex cost functions and 
are one of the better suited algorithms for parallel and distributed computation. 
However, success for network flow/ combinatorial techniques in generalized net-
works has been limited. Problems in generalized networks are inherently harder their 
counterparts in ordinary networks due to cycles which can generate or absorb net 
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flow. Polynomial complexity algorithms have only been realized for a very limited set 
of generalized network problems such as the generalized circulation problem [Radzik, 
1998] and restricted min-cost flow (Cohen and Megiddo, 1994a] where there are only 
sources and no sinks. The existence of a polynomial network flow based algorithm for 
the unrestricted min-cost flow with linear costs still remains an open question [Co-
hen and Megiddo, 1994b]. For generalized networks with nonlinear costs, techniques 
such as primal truncated-Network method {Ahlfeld et al., 1987], nonlinear variants of 
the primal simplex method and dual simplex method (Rockafeller, 1984], relaxation 
method (Tseng and Bertsekas, 1990, Bertsekas et al., 1987], and €-relaxation and 
ASSP (Tseng and Bertsekas, 2000, Guerriero and Tseng, 2002] have been proposed. 
Here again the E-CS techniques have been demonstrated to be among the fastest but 
they now have pseudo-polynomial complexity. 
A straightforward approach for solving RAP is to recast RAP as a standard gen-
eralized network problem and use the above algorithms. RAP can be transformed 
into a separable min-cost flow problem in generalized network (N, A) as shown in 
Fig. 2·6 by relabeling the sinks, introducing a flow absorbing cycle and setting 
Figure 2·6: RAP as min-cost flow problem. 
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if15:_i<5_N&N+1"5.j"5.N+M 
if N + 1 "5. i "5. N + M and j = M + M + 1 
1 
E (0, 1) 
0 
if1<5_i<5_N&N+1<5_j"5_N+M 
if N + 1 "5. i "5. N + M and j = M + N + 1 
if i = N + M + 1 and j = M + N + 2 
if i = N + M + 2 and j = M + N + 1 
else 
Si if 1 "5. i "5. N 
0 else 
Dropping the accents, 
if 1 "5. i "5. N & N + 1 "5. j "5. N + M 
if N + 1 "5. i "5. N + M and j = N + M + 1 
else 
mJn L Ai(xi,j) 
(i ,j)EA 
s.t. 
{jl(i,j)EA} 
x~O 
X ·. -t,J 
{jl(j,i)EA} 
Vi EN (2.17) 
This is analogous to solving the linear assignment problem as a min-cost flow problem 
using €-relaxation. However, we believe this approach can be improved significantly 
by exploiting the special bipartite structure of RAP, as was done for linear assignment 
problems. For linear assignment problems, even though the auction algorithm and 
E-relaxation have the same worst case complexity, auction empirically outperforms E-
relaxation by a wide margin as it is specialized to the bipartite graph structure arising 
for the assignment problem. Similarly RAP also has a bipartite graph structure and 
developing specialized algorithms to exploit it may allow faster algorithms. 
The only known polynomial-time results are available for RAP with logarithmic 
costs 
Vj E T 
where Wj and dj E ~+ [Devanur et al., 2008] and (Orlin, 2010]. These cannot be 
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generalized for other utilities as they exploit unique structure in KKT conditions 
resulting from logarithmic cost functions . 
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Chapter 3 
RAP Auction 
In this chapter we propose a new auction algorithm, called RAP Auction, for solving 
the equality constrained RAP without shipping costs i.e., 
minimize Lfi(zi) (3.1a) 
jET 
subject to 
.2:::::: Xij = Si ViEW (3.1b) 
jETi 
L CijXij = Zj V jET (3.1c) 
iEWj 
X 2:: 0 , z;:::o (3.ld) 
where W is the set of source nodes each with supply si, Tis the set of sink nodes 
each with non-increasing concave utility fi, and cij is the gain on arc (i,j). Also Wi 
and Ti denote the sources connected to lh sink and sinks connected to ith source, 
respectively. 
From Proposition 2.2, an optimal solution of this equality constrained problem is 
also optimal for the original problem (2.1) where we have an inequality constraint on 
the source nodes. 
For this problem, we say the triple (x, z , p) satisfies CS if x 2:: 0, z 2:: 0, and 
\f {i,j} E £with Xij > 0 (3.2a) 
(3.2b) 
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A key concept in auction is the notion of E-Complementary Slackness (E-CS) which 
ensmes that the algorithm doesn't get stuck in cycles or at corner points. We first 
develop an appropriate extension of this notion for RAP. 
D efinit ion 3. 1 Given E 2: 0, a flow-demand-price vector triple (x, z, p) is said to 
satisfy E-CS if x 2: 0, z 2: 0, and 
CijPJ 2: max CikPk - E 
kET; 
V {i,j} E [with Xij > 0 
- ff( zJ ) ~ PJ ~- fJ- (zJ ) V jE T 
cijPj 
maxcijPj- · 
(a) t:-CSarc 
X · . 1] 
P· J 
-af. J 
z . J 
(b) CSsink 
Figure 3· 1: Illustration of E-CS. (a) All pairs of arc flows Xij and ciJPJ 
should lie in the blue region, (b) All pairs of demand ZJ and PJ should 
lie on the blue line. 
(3.3a) 
(3 .3b) 
This is illustrated in Fig. 3·1. Note that this definition of E-CS is not the same as 
originally proposed in [Bertsekas et al., 1987]. We use the original definition only for 
flow-price pair (x, p) corresponding to the linear part of the network i.e., on the arcs 
in E. For the pair (z, p) corresponding to the nonlinear part we use the definition 
of CSsink· So the triple (x, z , p) satisfies E-CS iff (x, p) and (z, p) satisfy E-CSarc 
and CSsink , respectively. The intuition behind the E-CS conditions is that a feasible 
. flow-price pair is "approximately" primal and dual optimal if the t:-CS conditions are 
satisfied. This is quantified in the following proposition which bounds the duality 
gap: 
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Proposition 3.1 Let (x*, z*, p*) be a flow-demand-price triple satisfying c-CS such 
that (x*, z*) is primal feasible (satisfy all constraints in (3.1)), then 
0:::; f(z*)- q(J.L*, p*) :::; f. s'l (3.4) 
where the dual function q is defined in (2.4) and Jl.* is implicitly defined from p* using 
(2.9). 
Proof: From weak duality we have 
f(z*) ~ q(J.L*,p*). 
0:::; f(z*)- q(J.L*, p*) 
="'"""' {fi(z3*)- min(fi(zj) + pjzj)- "'"""' min(JL;- cijP3~)xij} + JL*'s L.....t z·>O L.....t x · ·>0 jET J- iEWj 'J-
= L {fi(zj)- ~~(Jj(Zj) + pjzj)} + 11-*'s (since 11;- CijPj ~ o) 
jET J-
= L {fi(zj)- fj(zj)- pjzj)} + JL*'s (since (z*, p*) satisfies CSsink) 
jET 
= 11-*'s- p*'z* 
= LJL; I:x;,j- LPj L cijx;j (since(x*, z*) is feasible) 
iEW jE'Ji jET iEWj 
= L L(JL;- CijPj)x;j 
iEW jE'Ji 
:::; E L L x;j = f. s'l. 
iEW jETi 
• 
If we had used original definition of c-CS, then the bound on duality gap would depend 
on z*. So our definition c-CS results in tighter and cleaner bound on duality gap. 
38 
3.1 The Algorithm 
RAP Auction is a primal-dual method as it simultaneously iterates over prices and 
demands with E-CS as an invariant and terminates when all the resources have been 
fully allocated. In a typical iteration, prices have to be computed for given demands, 
and demands for given prices which are CSsink consistent. This requires a map 
(3.5) 
where Zi = ~+ is the demand space and Pi = <I> i ( Zi) is the price space. We also 
need the inverse mapping 
8i: Pi f---1- Zi. 
From (2.11), (3.3b) and (2.6), these mappings are monotonic. However they may not 
be well defined for some utility functions . For easy of exposition, we will start with 
the following following assumptions on the utility functions which ensure that these 
mappings are implicitly well defined: 
Assumption 3.1 f/(0) > -oo V j E 7. 
By Corollary 2.1, this keeps prices real. 
Assumption 3.2 fi are continuously differentiable. 
With differentiability, (3.3b) reduces to Pi= -\lfj(zj)· So 
Assumption 3.3 fi are strictly convex. 
(3.6) 
Strict convexity is sufficient for differentiability of the conjugate function iii, defined 
in (2.7), over its effective domain ~- (c.f. Proposition 9.6 [Bertsekas, 1998]), i.e., 
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(2.6) simplifies to 
Differentiability of both the cost functions and their conjugate functions along with 
their relation given by (2.8) implies 
\lqj = \lfj -1 
:. e j(Pj) = v Jj - 1 ( -pj) 
Computations are simplified if \lfj - 1 has an analytical form. For example if f j(zj) = 
exp(-zj ), then 
Fig. 3·2 illustrates these mappings for a sample cost function under these assumptions. 
Now from monotonicity of utilities and (3.6), we can easily put a lower bound on the 
p 
z z 
(a) Sample cost functions (b) Forward mapping 8 1 
Figure 3·2: Sample cost functions satisfying assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 
3.3 and their corresponding forward mapping. 
pnce as 
Pmin t:, min inf Pj 2: 0. 
jET 
We use the following notation to describe the RAP Auction Algorithm: 
• p (t) , x(t) , z (t) denote the price, flow and demand vectors at the beginning of 
tth iteration, respectively, 
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• 9i denotes the surplus of source i E W : 
9i(t) 6 Si- 2::: Xij(t) 
jE7i 
ViEW, 
At the start of the generic tth iteration we have flow-demand-price vector triple 
(x(t), z(t), p(t)) that satisfies E-CS, the flow-demand pair (x(t), z(t)) satisfies (3.lc) 
and g(t) ~ 0. We will show later that each iteration preserves all these conditions. 
As an initial choice, we may use 
z(1) = 0, x(1) = 0, and 
Pi(1) = !l>i(O) V jET. 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
Assumption 3.1 ensures that p(1) E ~+. If it is possible to provide a starting point 
(x(1),z(1) , p(1) = !l>j(z(1))) such that Zj > 0 if !l>j(O) = oo, then assumption 3.1 can 
be relaxed. Such a starting point exists from Lemma 2.1. Assumptions 3.2, and 3.3 
will be relaxed in Section 3.3. 
A generic iteration consists of two phases: the bidding phase and the allocation 
phase. Sources with surplus bid for their best sinks during bidding phase. Bidding 
consist of determining the best sink which is bid for, bid surplus, the amount that 
can be allocated and bid price, the price below which sink being bid for stops being 
almost the best. 
Bidding Phase: 
Select a source i E W with gi(t) > 0; if no such source can be found, the algorithm 
terminates. 
Step 1: (Select best sink) Compute the current value vii = CiiPi(t) of each sink 
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j E T;. Find a sink j 1 offering the best value 
Vbest = max Vij' jE7i 
and a sink }2 offering second best value 
!Til~ 2 
else 
Step 2: (Compute bid price): Compute i's bid price for j 1 as 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
As long as Pi! remains above b, sink j 1 continues to provide nearly the best value to 
source z. 
Step 3: (Submit bid) Submit the bid {y, b} to sink j 1 where y = cij19i· 
The bidding process is illustrated in Fig. 3·3. As long as Pi! (t) ~ b, arc (i, ji) satisfies 
Values of sinks 
for source i 
;~ t€· -·vsec =.vijz . . 
· ··-··~ij 1b .value below wh1ch Jl stops being j4 
almost the best sink for i 
Figure 3·3: Illustration of the bidding phase involving a source i. Sinks j 1 
and jz that offer the best and second best value, respectively, are determined. 
Source i bids for j1 with bid price b. 
E-CSarc i.e. , sink j 1 provides almost the best value to source i. So the bid price, b, 
denotes the lower bound on the price of j 1 below which flow xi,ii has to be reversed 
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else E-CSarc will be violated. Note that b < Pi1 (t), as 
(3.11) 
When a sink j receives a new bid {yfew, bfew}, it rw1s the allocation phase. To 
accept flow from a source (increase zi), the sink needs to reduce its price as given by 
Pi = <I>i(zi)· Now j may have received flows from different sources say { i 1 , i 2 , ... , in} 
during previous iterations. Such flows are called pre-existing flows. Reducing its price 
during the current iteration may take it below the bid price of such pre-existing flows. 
So some of the existing flow maybe be rejected. For ease of exposition, we use the 
following representation for previously accepted and still valid bids at a given sink j: 
• Bi = {bi1 , bi2 , ••• , bin}: List of accepted bid prices in order of decreasing value, 
i.e. 
• }j ={Yip Yi 2 , ••• , Yin}: List of flows received where Yik is an alias for cikixiki(t) 
with bik as the corresponding bid price. So 
n 
zi(t) = LYik· 
k=l 
• We use bio as an alias for Pi(t). 
A source ik's pre-existing bid {Yik' biJ is valid if Pi ~ bik and Yik > 0. 
The state at the sink j at the beginning of the allocation phase is illustrated in 
Fig. 3·4. As flow starts getting accepted from i during the current iteration, the 
demand zi increases and the demand-price pair slides to the right of 'A' along the 
blue curve. We call this mode of acceptance as absorption. Up to 80 of flow can be 
absorbed before reaching 'B'. This is called as the demand margin between successive 
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Figure 3·4: State of sink j at the beginning of allocation phase. The 
blue curve is the locus of CSsink price demand pairs {>..,T}. 'A' cor-
responds the current demand-price pair ( Zj ( t), Pi ( t)) at the beginning 
of the allocation phase. b and { bh, . .. , bin } correspond to the current 
and old bid prices, respectively, with corresponding flows {Yi1 , ... , Yin}. 
n' - 1 is the index of the lowest bid with bid price strictly higher than 
b. So bids with prices {bip ... , bin' - J can be reversed during the cur-
rent iteration. The length of the red line corresponds to the maximum 
flow Ymax that can be accepted from i. The purple line signifies the bid 
surplus y from i. Based on this, a subset of old bids {bi1 , . . . , bin" } are 
reversed. 
prices Pi(t) and bi1 · In general, we define demand margin, ok, as 
(3.12) 
If yyew > 60 , then the demand-price pair will reach 'B ' . At 'B ', flow can't be absorbed 
as before since the source i 1 's flow will violate E-CSa.rc if P.i falls below bi1 . So while 
at 'B ' flow from i is accepted by reversing flow to i 1 . We call this mode of flow 
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acceptance as reversal. The price and demand don't change during this mode. If 
Yiew ~ 80 +Yip then this bid is completely reversed. Now between bi1 and bi2 up to 
81 can be absorbed before reversing i 2 's bid and so forth. As long as Pi ~ biew , sink j 
offers almost the highest value to source i. So source i pushes flow to j until either Pi 
drops to biew (saturating push) or surplus at source i is exhausted (exhausting push). 
Let Ymax denote the maximum flow that can be accept at j before Pi drops to bnew 
i.e., 
n'-1 n 1-1 
Ymax = L(Yik + ok-d + On'-1 = LYik + <I>i(b)- zi(t) 
k=1 k=1 
where n' - 1 is the index of the lowest bid with bid price strictly higher than biew. 
During this iteration, a total flow of min{Ymax' ynew} is accepted. If y < Ymax , then i 
is exhausted and only pre-existing flows from a set of sources { i 1 , .. . , in"} are reversed 
where 0 :::; n" :::; n'. This logic is carried out during the allocation phase. 
Allocation Phase: 
Select a sink j E T which received a new bid {yrew , biew }. 
1. If sink j has previously accepted bid from source i 
(a) Then update bi = biew and re-sort Bi and }j accordingly. 
(b) Else insert bfew and 0 in Bi and }j, respectively, in sorted order. 
Let n' be the index corresponding to the current bid, i.e. , i~ = i. We assume 
that the sorting is such that 
2. If Yiew ~ Ymax 
Non-exhausting push: 
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(a) Reverse bids from sources { i1, ... , in'-1} while accepting Ymax from source 
'l, 
3. Else 
Exhausting push: Determine the set of sources { ik : 1 ::; k ::; n"} whose bids 
have to be completely reversed where n" < n'. Source ik 's bid has to be reversed 
if k < n' and 
k 
L(Yil + 8t-d ::; Yrw. 
1=1 
(a) If Yiew ::; ~~:1 (Yik + Dk-1) + Dn" 
Allocation with complete reversals and absorptions: 
1. Reverse bids from { i1, ... , in"} completely while accepting Yiew from 
'l, 
ii. Set Zj(t + 1) = ~~=n"+l Yik and 
PJ(t + 1) = if>j(Zj(t + 1)). 
(b) else 
Allocation with at least one partial reversal: 
1. Reverse { i1, ... , in"} bids completely and bin"+I partially while accept-
ing Yiew from i, 
Reversing bid to source ik implies setting Xkj(t + 1) = 0 and deleting bik and Yik from 
BJ and }j, respectively. Notice that the above description processes a bid from one 
source to one sink at a time. This can be viewed as a Gauss-Seidel iteration where 
each iteration consists of a bidding and an allocation phase. 
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3.2 Analysis and Termination of RAP Auction 
In this section we establish the validity of RAP Auction; that is, we establish that 
RAP Auction terminates in a finite number of iterations with a solution that satisfies 
primal feasibility and E-CS. 
Proposition 3.2 RAP Auction preserves E-CS, flow conservation at sinks i.e., (3.1c), 
and non-negative source surpluses throughout its execution; that is, if the allocation 
and prices at the beginning of the iteration satisfy E-CS, (3.lc), and g 2: 0, then same 
is true at the end of iteration. 
Proof: Assume that during the current iteration, sink j receives a bid. During 
this iteration, only the price of lh sink, its demand and the flows to it can change. 
So the properties hold for other sinks and arcs. We only have to consider sink j and 
flows to it. Flows are rejected or reversed before sink price fall below their former bid 
prices, so we have for all arcs incident to sink j 
This relation is true for pre-existing flows as well as the flow accepted from the bidding 
source in this iteration. 
Observe that { z(t)} is a non-decreasing sequence. It increases strictly during 
absorption and is unchanged during reversals. From convexity and monotonicity, it 
follows that {p(t)} is a non-increasing sequence. From this monotonicity of prices, 
(3.10) and (3.9), we have 
l7il 2: 2 
else 
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Equality holds for the bid received in the current iteration. If Pi(t + 1) ~ bi, then 
Hence E-CSarc is preserved on all arcs with positive flows. Steps 2b, 3(a)ii and 3(b)ii 
in Allocation Procedure enforce (3.lc) and CSsink· So for all the arcs and sinks, we 
have E-CSarc and CSsink, respectively. Hence E-CS holds for triple (x(t), z(t), p(t)). 
Surpluses of bidding sources can decrease at most to zero. The surpluses at other 
sources can only increase due to reversals of their flows. So all the surpluses remain 
non-negative. • 
It follows from this proposition that if the RAP auction terminates, it does so with 
an E-CS satisfying flow-demand-price triple (x*, z*, p*) such that (x*, z*) is primal 
feasible as the termination criterion g = 0 enforces (3.1b). So the validity of RAP 
Auction rests on whether it terminates finitely. At any iteration, we can define the 
admissible graph Q that contains arcs oriented in the direction of possible flow change. 
In particular, for each source i E W, Q contains one forward arc (i,j) E E such that 
if i were to bid, it would bid for j, i.e., 
j = argmaxcikPk(t), 
kETi 
and for each sink j E T, Q contains a reverse arc for each valid bid leveled with Pi, 
i.e., if Pi(t) = bij, then (j, i) C Q. Flow can only increase on forward arcs while it can 
only reduce on reverse arcs. The forward arcs are uncapacitated while the reverse 
arcs are capacitated. The capacity of a reverse arc (j, i) is Xij(t). When the flow on 
the reverse arc becomes zero, it is said to be saturated. When there is a saturated 
push on a forward arc, it becomes a reverse arc at the end of this iteration. We say it 
is saturated. We now show that for an arc ( i, j) to go from being a forward to reverse 
arc, Pi has to drop by at least Emin· 
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Lemma 3.1 A pre-existing flow at a given sink can't be reversed unless the sink 
price drops by at least Emin with respect to its price in the iteration when this flow was 
allocated. 
Proof: Assume that in some iteration t 0 , i bids for j at bid price b. (i, j) is a 
forward arc of Q(t0 ). From (3.11), 
Now i can be outbid in a subsequent iteration t only if 
So 
• 
In what follows, by a path P in Q, we mean a sequence of nodes (i1 , i2 ... , im) in 
W U T and an associated sequence of (m- 1) arcs in £ such that , for each k = 
1, ... , m- 1, (ik, ik+I) or (ik+l, i;.) is an arc of the sequence. The set of forward arcs 
of P (those of the form (ik, ik+I) is denoted by p+ and the set of reverse arcs of P 
(those of the form ( ik+l, ik)) is denoted by p-. We define the gain of the path P by 
'YP = ( II Cij) I ( II Cij) ' 
(i ,j)EP+ (i,j)EP-
(3.13) 
with 'YP = 1 if P comprises of a single node. A cycle is a path whose starting node 
equals the ending node. 
Note that admissible graph may contain cycles. Let C denote one such cycle. If 
'Yc, the cycle is said to be flow generating else it is flow absorbing. We now show that 
cycles in Q, if any, are flow generating. 
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Lemma 3.2 Cycles in admissible graph are flow generating , i.e, cycle gain ~ 1 
Proof: Let C be one such cycle in Q where C = (i 1 , j 1 , i 2 , ... , Jm, im+l = il) and 
V k = 1, ... ,m 
• (ik,jk) E c+, set of forward arcs. So 
• (ik+1,jk) E c-, set of reverse arcs. So 
From (3.14) and (3.15), we have 
and 
So 
cili1 > Pim 
Cidm Pi! 
Cikik > Pik-1 
cikik-1 Pik 
(3 .14) 
(3.15) 
V k = 2, .. . ,m 
(3.16) 
• 
In the auction algorithm for the linear assignment, the finite termination argument 
is simplified because the prices change by at least E in every iteration. However RAP 
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action can have iterations which result in no change in prices. We call such iterations 
as Non Price Reducing (NPR) iterations. For example an iteration in which all the 
flow is accepted entirely by reversal there is no change in the price. The prices may 
not change in every iteration but we show in the following Lemma that prices are 
guaranteed to drop by at least Emin after finite iterations. 
Lemma 3.3 After finite number of iterations, prices drop by at least Emin or the 
algorithm terminates. 
Proof: Assume the contrary that there is a sequence of infinite successive iter-
ations, denoted by ~ = {1, 2, ... , }, such that 
llp(1) - t~~ p(t) It)() < Emin · 
Define n(t) = #U(t), number of source nodes with nonzero surplus at timet and its 
variation as 
\ln(t) = n(t + 1)- n(t). (3.17) 
During this sequence none of the iterations can have any saturating pushes on the 
forward arcs else there is a price drop of at least Emin· So all iterations are exhausting. 
Sinks accept flow by reversal or absorption or both. So we can classify iterations 
during this sequence as: 
1. Reversal Push {RP ): In such iterations, flow is entirely or partially accepted by 
reversal. Such iterations can decrease or increase n(t + 1), i.e., 
\ln(t) ;::: -1. 
From lemma 3.1, flows allocated during iterations ~ can't be reversed. So at 
each sink j, there are only finite number of arcs which can be reversed during 
this sequence, corresponding to bids from iterations previous to ~. For each 
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sink j E T, let mj be the number of previous such bids, i.e., 
p·(l)>b· >···>b· >p·(l)-E · J - 11 - - tmj J mtn 
where 
We denote this set of reversible arcs as 
Erev = { (i, j) E £: Xij(l) > 0 & bij > Pj(l)- Emin}· 
For all arcs in Erev, {xij(t)}tEll is a decreasing sequence. 
We now argue that there can only be finite number of reversal iterations. As-
sume that there can be infinite iterations with reversals. Then there is at least 
one source i which makes infinite exhausting bids for at least one sink j and 
some arc (i, j) where flow is strictly reversed infinite number of times. To be 
able to make infinite exhausting bids, there has to be some sink other than j 
which reverses flow to i. Continuing in this manner, we can construct sequence 
of infinite circulations in at least one cycle containing forward arc ( i, j) and 
reverse arc (i,j). However such cycles are flow generating (from lemma 3.2). 
So after finite circulations in this cycle, at least one of the reverse arcs gets 
saturated. Hence we arrive at a contradiction. 
2. Non Reversal Push (NRP ): In such iterations, flow is completely accepted with-
out any reversal which strictly decreases the number of sources with surplus, 
I.e., 
\7n(t) = -1 V t E llNRP· (3.18) 
where llN RP is the subsequence of ll with NRP iterations. We show that there 
can only be finitely many such iterations by showing that n(t) can't increase 
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arbitrarily. The subsequence of .~ for which n(t) strictly increases is defined as 
~ + ( t) !5. { 1 :::; l < t : V' n( l) > 0}. (3.19) 
This happens if at least two flow reversals (one complete and one at least partial) 
take place during a given iteration as the bidding source is itself exhausted. 
Since there are only finite reversible arcs, we have for all t 2: 1 
and the positive variation is also bounded as an arc once saturated remains 
saturated. 
2::: V'n(l) :::; #Erev· (3.20) 
!Ell. +(t) 
For any t 2: 1, from (3.17) 
t-1 
n(t)- n(tt) = 2::: V'n(l) 
2::: V'n(l) + 2::: V'n(l) 
lEll.+(t) lEll.NRP(t) 
:::; #Erev- #~NRP(t) 
where ~NRP(t) = {l E ~NRP : l :::; t}. The last inequality follows from (3.20), 
(3.18) and 
\i'n(l) = 0 \1 [ tf_ ~ +(t) u ~NRP(t). 
So 
#~NRP :::; #Erev- n(t) + n(1) :::; A+ N. {3.21) 
Hence we can only have finitely many iterations without the prices dropping by at 
least Emin· • 
Given this proving finite termination is trivial. 
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Proposition 3.3 RAP Auction algorithm terminates after finite iterations. 
Proof: The sequence PJ(t) is a non increasing sequence and lower bounded by 
Pmin 2: 0. If the algorithm doesn 't terminate, then from lemma 3.3 there exists at least 
one sink where the price drops by at least Emin infinitely often. Hence limt---+= PJ ( t) ----+ 
-oo which is a contradiction. • 
3.3 RAP Auction for generalized convex utilities 
In the previous section, we derived RAP Auction for strictly convex and continuously 
differentiable convex utilities. In this section, we show how these assumptions can be 
relaxed. We first relax the continuously differentiable assumption 3.2. Let ZJ c ZJ 
be the set where fJ is not differentiable. Then due to convexity, ZJ consists of at 
most countably many points [Rockafeller, 1984]. At these points, the mapping <I>J is 
no longer implicitly defined as there is an interval of prices which satisfy CSsink with 
respect to a given demand, i.e., 
as illustrated in Fig. 3·5 . We can resolve this ambiguity by explicitly mapping to any 
zi T zi T 
(a) Cost function (b) CSsink 
Figure 3·5: Impact of non-differentiability. (a) Cost function is not 
differentiable at ZJ. (b) All demand-prices pairs on the blue line satisfy 
CSsink. For T = Zj, there is an interval of CSsink compatible prices. 
price in such intervals. vVhile any arbitrary price in this interval is valid , we argue 
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that - Jf ( ZJ) is the best price. Sources bid for sinks based on their prices and want 
to push flow to the one offering the best value. This flow push is either accepted 
by absorption or reversal or partly both. Sufficient condition for strictly positive 
absorption at the current demand-price pair (zJ,PJ = <I>J(zJ)) is for <r>J to be right 
continuous at ZJ as explained in Fig. 3·6. Not only is this mapping E-CS consistent 
but most aggressive in terms of price reduction which leads to faster termination as 
it completely avoids iterations such as ones shown in Fig. 3·6. This guarantees that 
every price drop results from strictly positive flow absorption. Now if a sink j has a 
Pj = -fj-(Zj) 
b 
+ 
-fi (zi) 
Figure 3·6: CSsink curve for sink j showing why its desirable to have 
right continuous <I> J. Assume that ZJ is the demand at sink j at the 
beginning of the current iteration and we use PJ(t) = - fj-( zj)· This 
corresponds to 'A' on the curve. b is the current bid price. At the end 
of this iteration, PJ(t + 1) = b but no flow is accepted from i as the 
demand margin 80 = 0. There is a price drop without any absorption. 
If we had used PJ(t) =-Jf(zJ), then j wouldn't have received a bid in 
this iteration and if it does during a subsequent iteration, then there 
will be positive flow acceptance. 
pre-existing flow from a source, say i 1 , with bid price bh in - ofJ(zj) as shown in Fig. 
3·7. We need <I>J(zJ ) ;:::: bi1 so as to not violate E-CSarc unless this bid is completely 
reversed. This suggests using 
(3.22) 
where bi1 refers to the highest bid with Yi1 > 0. At points where fJ is differentiable, 
ZJ E ZJ\ZJ, (3.22) reduces to (3 .6) as bi1 ~ - f j-(zJ) =-Jf(zJ) · So we can use (3.22) 
_,j-(~j) 
11 
-tt(zj) 
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T 
Figure 3·7: Case when there is a pre-existing bid with bid price in 
-ofj(zj)· Here using <Pj(zj) = - Jf( zj ) violates E-CSarc on arc (i1 , j). 
A valid mapping is <P j ( Zj ) = bh. 
for all Zj E Zj. 
Without the strict convexity assumption, the conjugate functions (ji may not be 
continuously differentiable at most at countably many points, say Pi. At these points 
demands are not uniquely determined by prices as 
T E oqj( -,\) = [qj( -,\), qj( -,\)] 'If,\ E Fj 
as shown in Fig. 3·8. Relaxation of strict convexity and differentiability have analo-
T T 
(a) Cost function (b) CSsink 
Figure 3·8: Impact of non-strict convexity. (a) Cost function is not 
strictly convex everywhere. (b) All demand-prices pairs on the blue 
line satisfy CSsink· For ,\ = Pl and P2, there are intervals of CSsink 
compatible demands. 
gous effects on demands and prices, respectively. The algorithms uses 8 j to compute 
demand margins (3.12) but 8j is not implicitly and uniquely defined as before. We 
first define demand margin more carefully. It is desirable to reverse flows only when 
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absolutely necessary i.e., they would violate E-CSarc if not reversed. So we define 
demand margin between two bid prices bik and bik+1 as the maximum flow that can 
be absorbed after ik 's bid is completely reversed and before ik+l 's bid needs to be 
reversed (see Fig. 3·9). This suggests using 
qj( ->.) 
max{T E Zjlfj-(T) ~ ->.}. 
Last inequality follows from (2.8). From Lemma 9.1, fj is differentiable if qj is not 
8-(b· ) 
J 'k 
8-(b· ) 
J 1k+1 
T 
Figure 3-9: CSsink curve for sink j showing the correct way to compute 
the demand margin between two bids. 
differentiable i.e., \:1 >. E Pj 
and 
So 
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max{T E ZJifj- (T) :S: ->.} 
max{ T E ZJifj-(T) = ->.} 
sup{ T E ZJIV fJ(-t) = - >.} 
sup{T E ZJI<P(T) = >.}. 
However with this definition, for the current price-demand pair (PJ = <PJ(zJ), zj), 
with strict inequality when 
as shown in Fig. 3·10. In such cases, the computed demand margin between the 
A 
I 
b· I 11 -1.;:..-:.. -:..t:.. ~·-----
1 I I 
!+-
T 
Figure 3·10: CSsink curve for sink j. 'A' corresponds to the current 
demand-price pair (pj, ZJ)· For this price 8J(PJ) > Zj· So the demand 
margin calculated as 8 J ( bi1 )- 8 J (PJ) underestimates the actual demand 
margin, 60 = 8J(biJ-zJ. Also if the current bid surplus y < 8J(PJ)- zj, 
then in this iteration there is non-zero flow absorption without any price 
drop. 
current price PJ and the highest pre-existing bid price is lower than the actual demand 
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margin as 
8·(b· )- 8·(p·) < 8 ·(b· )- z· J tl J J J tl J. 
This can be fixed by redefining demand margin as 
(3.23) 
Under strict convexity, flow absorption at a sink results in a price drop. By 
relaxing this assumption, we can have the following situation (see Fig. 3·10) 
Then during allocation phase there is absorption but there is no price reduction. 
Note that these mappings are intentionally defined to be E-CS consistent. With 
strict convexity and differentiability, we had that flow absorptions imply price re-
duction. However, by relaxing them, it is possible to have flow absorption without 
price reduction and price reduction without flow absorption. This has no bearing on 
the analysis presented section 3.2 as it doesn't assume flow absorptions imply price 
reduction. It is based on counting reversal and non reversal pushes rather than price 
reducing or non-price reducing iterations. 
Chapter 4 
Distributed RAP 
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In this chapter we explore algorithms for solving distributed RAP. In a distributed 
framework, we consider the problem as one in which a set of autonomous agents with 
resources make local decisions and collaborate with others to reach globally optimal 
allocation of their resources to a set of tasks. In spite of limited, unreliable, delayed 
communication or memory access capabilities and with no or minimum coordination, 
the goal is to design algorithms that converge to near optimal solutions of RAP. 
4.1 Background 
The foundations of asynchronous techniques and their convergence for strictly convex 
optimization problems are discussed in [Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1997]. Two models 
for asynchronous computation, total or partial asynchronism, have been defined based 
on whether the delays are unbounded or bounded, respectively. In this chapter we 
will focus on the totally asynchronous paradigm. 
All the methods discussed in Section 2.4 were proposed for centralized sequential 
implementation. None of these methods or any other methods have been extended 
for distributed implementation and if implemented in distributed networks, they may 
require excessive information exchange and overhead. Algorithms with decomposable 
computation structure such as coordinate ascent in primal or dual spaces are ideal 
candidates for distributed implementations. RWOA, discussed in Section 2.4.2, is 
a block coordinate descent algorithm in primal space while Subgradient Ascent of 
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Section 2.4.3 is a dual ascent algorithm. 
Apart from these methods, RAP Auction has a very simple and separable compu-
tation structure which makes it a natural candidate for distributed implementation. 
In RAP Auction, there is a price for each task node and in each iteration, source 
nodes with surpluses bid for their best tasks. The task node being bid for, decides 
on how much resource to accept from the bidding source node. This simple compute 
structure inherently makes this algorithm suitable for distributed implementation. 
4.2 Subgradient Ascent 
A possible algorithm for distributed solution of RAP problems is the Subgradient 
Ascent technique discussed in Section 2.4.3. In essence an iteration for this technique 
is 
where 
The asynchronous convergence for a randomized implementation, called Randomized 
Incremental Subgradient Methods, was developed in [Nedic et al. , 2001, Nedic and 
Ozdaglar, 2009]. 
The computation structure for implementing this iteration is illustrated in Fig.4-l. 
In this architecture, the sinks solve their corresponding subproblems (2.14) to compute 
their subgradients dj but the prices still have to be updated in a centralized fashion. 
As pointed out in Section 2.4.3 this method is not guaranteed to terminate in a 
feasible solution and one is still left with the problem of computing a near-optimal 
feasible allocation. 
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Figure 4·1: Dual Ascent. 
4.3 Distributed RWOA 
Another possibility is to use RWOA for solving RAP in distributed architectures. 
RWOA can be formulated as a sequential nonlinear Gauss-Seidel algorithm [Bertsekas 
and Tsitsiklis, 1997] where in any given iteration, one source solves its corresponding 
SRAP and updates its allocations as 
k=i 
otherwise 
where 
Qi(x(t)) : 
arg mznxix ri?.O 2::= fj (cijXij + 2::= CkjXkj(t)) 
jET;. kEWj\i 
subject to 2::= Xij = si 
jET;. 
Here we use following notation: 
(4.1) 
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Qi(x) is well defined when f is a strictly convex function. Observe that strict con-
vexity of f implies that for each i, F is a strictly convex function of xi, when the 
other components of x are held constant. Note that F can't be strictly convex jointly 
in all the variables x. However, this is sufficient to guarantee the convergence of the 
synchronous algorithm 
Proposition 4.1 Given that the strict convexity and continuous differentiability of 
f, every limit point of {x(t)} corresponding to synchronous RWOA is stationary i.e., 
a global minima. 
Proof: We have this result from Proposition 3.9 in Chapter 3 [Bertsekas and 
Tsitsiklis, 1997]. • 
For asynchronous implementation, we are interested in the generalized iteration 
k = i(t) 
(4.2) 
otherwise 
where i(t) is a source of W, x(Ti(t)(t)) is the source's local copy of x(t) and t- Ti(t)(t) 
is the delay. This does not involve any loss of generality since an iteration involving 
multiple sources may be broken down into several iterations each involving one source. 
Unfortunately, we have the following negative result for this iteration. 
Proposition 4.2 Limit points of {x(t)} corresponding to asynchronous RWOA may 
not be stationary. 
Proof: Note that an iteration of synchronous nonlinear Jacobi algorithm [Bert-
sekas and Tsitsiklis, 1997] 
can be seen as an instance of the generalized iteration (4.2). Now Figure 4·2 il-
lustrates a counter example where the Jacobi algorithm does not convergence as it 
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oscillates between non-stationary limit points even though we have strict convexity 
and continuous differentiability of f. 
Figure 4·2: Counter example for convergence of Nonlinear Jacobi 
Algorithm for RWOA. With initial solution x(O) = 0, the Nonlinear 
Jacobi iterations oscillate between the limit points (0, s, s, 0, s, 0) and 
(s, 0, 0, s, 0, s) neither of which is stationary. Heres = ln(3)/1.5 and 
X= (xn, X12, X22 1 X23 1 X32, X34). 
4.4 Distributed RAP Auction 
• 
RAP Auction described in Chapter 3 is a synchronous algorithm as there is a strict 
separation between bidding and allocation phases. An easy extension is to allow 
multiple sources to bid in parallel and allow the sinks to process the bids received in 
sequence, and reject any bids for which the bid price is too high when the allocation 
phase is processing that bid. However, for such synchronous implementations, delays 
are incurred when source nodes calculating their bids have to wait to make sure that 
up-to-date prices are available, and when the sinks calculating the allocations wait for 
all bids to come in. These penalties may be reduced by asynchronous implementation. 
We now formulate a totally asynchronous RAP Auction and prove its validity. We 
use the following notation: 
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• Pi(t): price of sink j at time t, 
• Zj(t): demand at sink j at timet, 
• Xij ( t): flow allocated to sink j from source i at time t, 
• gi(t): part of surplus at source i at timet which hasn't been submitted as a bid 
to any sink, 
• U(t): set of all sources with positive total surplus at time t i.e., 
Si > LXij(t) 
jET;_ 
ViE U(t). 
• R(t) c U(t): set of sources with a 'ready bid' at timet. 
We assume that these quantities can change only at integer times t; this involves no 
loss of generality, since t may be viewed as the index of a sequence of physical times 
at which events of interest occur. Sources with positive surplus enter the set R(t) and 
become eligible to bid. At each timet, if R(t) is empty nothing happens. If R(t) is 
nonempty then a nonempty subset of R(t) submit their bids to their preferred sinks. 
We assume that at timet, a source i E R(t) has used the prices Pi(Tij(t)) from some 
earlier (but otherwise arbitrary) times Tij(t) ::; t to compute its bid {yi(t), bi(t)} using 
the Bidding Procedure (same as that in Chapter 3 except the delayed prices). Note 
t - Tij(t) is the delay in source i 's copy of price of sink j at time t. Without loss 
of generality, we assume that sources entering R(t) have computed their bids in the 
current time slot itself. The impact of bids being computed in arbitrary previous time 
slots is the same as using outdated prices and hence can be modeled into Tij(t) . 
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Bidding Procedure: 
Step 1: (Select best sink) Compute the current value Vij = cikPk(Tij(t)) of each 
sink j E 7i. Find a sink j 1 offering the best value 
Vbest = max Vij' jET;_ 
and a sink h offering second best value 
17il ~ 2 
else 
Step 2: (Compute bid price): Compute i's bid price for j 1 as 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
Step 3: (Submit bid) Submit the bid {yi(t), b(t)} to sink j 1 and set 9i(t + 1) = 0 
where Yi(t) = cij9i(t). 
Without loss of generality, we assume that a sink processes at most one bid 
per time slot. When a sink j receives a new bid, say at time t, from source i 
{Yiew(ti), bfew(ti)}, it is possible that biew(ti) > pj(t) as bfew(ti) was computed at 
time ti ::::; t using outdated prices and such bids have to be obviously rejected. How-
ever only rejecting bids above p( t) is not sufficient for finite termination. Bids should 
only be accepted if Pj ( t) ~ biew ( ti) + c I Cij. We call such bids substantive. This ensures 
that Lemma 3.1 holds which ensures that between flow augmentation and reversal on 
a arc ( i, j), the price of j has to drop by at least c I cij. This property will be crucial 
in the proof for finite time termination. 
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Allocation Procedure 
(a) Execute the Allocation Procedure specified in Chapter 3. 
2. Return the unaccepted surplus, say Yi, to bidding source i. If there were any 
flow reversals, then return the rejected flows to the corresponding sources. 
Assume that during an allocation procedure at sink j at time tj either a flow or 
surplus return y message was sent to source i. Whenever a source i receives this flow 
or surplus return y from sink j , say at t ~ ti then it updates its surplus as 
9i(t + 1) = 9i(t) + yjcij· 
Note that gi(t) is not the actual surplus at the source i but only the surplus that 
hasn't been bid to any of the sinks. Even if a source i has gi(t) = 0, the presence of 
unprocessed bids or delayed surplus/flow return messages implies U(t) may contain 
1-. Hence U(t) is known only to the oracle. 
To maximize the generality and flexibility of our model, the precise mechanism by 
which prices, surplus returns and flow reversal communications from sinks to sources 
are done is left unspecified subject to the following two assumptions: 
Assumption 4.1 U(t): nonempty =? R(t'): nonempty for some t' ~ t. 
Assumption 4.2 For all i, j, and t, 
lim Tij(t) = oo. 
t--+oo 
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The first assumption ensures that sources with surpluses eventually bid, sinks eventu-
ally receive these bids and process them, and surplus and flow return messages from 
sinks are eventually received by the sources. So this assumption allows for arbitrary 
delays but requires lossless communication. The second assumptions ensures that 
sources copy of sinks prices can't remain too outdated for long. Clearly an asyn-
chronous algorithm cannot solve the problem if sources with surplus stop submitting 
bids, sinks do not process submitted bids and if old information is not eventually 
discarded. This is the motivation for the preceding two assumptions. 
It is possible that a sink has multiple bids for the same source. This can happen 
when a source i after submitting a bid to a sink j receives a flow reject from some 
other sink. It is possible that the new surplus is again bid to sink j. So sink j may 
have more than one bids from the same source. In such a case, we assume that the 
bids from the same source are processed in order. 
Note that the prices and flows change only in the allocation procedure at the sinks. 
The following proposition shows the invariants of the allocation procedure. 
Proposition 4.3 The allocation procedure preserves E-CS, (3.1c), and non-negative 
source surpluses throughout its execution; that is, if the allocations and prices at the 
beginning of the allocation iteration satisfy E-CS, (3.lc), and g 2': 0, then same is true 
at the end of iteration. 
Proof: If this bid is non-substantive then there is not change in the flows and 
prices. So we continue to preserve all the properties. For substantive bids, most of 
the analysis presented in Proposition 3.2 of RAP Auction is valid except for the fact 
that all the bid prices {bi}, of pre-existing as well as the current bids, were computed 
at past times ti 's using outdate prices {Pi ( Tij ( ti))} jETi. However, from monotonicity 
of prices {p(t)} and Tij(ti) ~ ti ~ t , we have 
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This along with ( 4.4) and ( 4.3) ensure that for all bid prices, we continue to have 
{ 
maxkE7i\j CikPk ( t) - E 
c··b· > t) t -
Pmin- E 
17il 2:: 2 
else 
Hence E-CSarc is preserved on all arcs with positive flows. The rest of the proof follows 
exactly as in Proposition 3.2. • 
The algorithm can be stopped as soon as the set of sources with surplus U(t) is 
empty. We say that the algorithm terminates at time t if t is the first time U(t) is 
empty. Detecting termination in a totally asynchronous algorithm requires additional 
messages among sources and sinks to establish that indeed, U(t) is empty [Bertsekas 
and Tsitsiklis, 1997]. We won't consider the additional time in this algorithm, as it 
is known to be finite in nature with similar delay assumptions as stated above. 
It follows from the above proposition that if the algorithm terminates, it does 
so with an E-CS satisfying flow-demand-price triple (x*, z*, p*) such that (x*, z*) is 
primal feasible as the termination criterion g = 0 enforces (3.1b). So the validity 
of asynchronous RAP Auction rests on whether it terminates finitely. To prove this 
result we need to introduce the admissible graph for distributed RAP Auction. We 
claim that distributed RAP Auction has the same effective admissible graph as RAP 
Auction. Recall that in RAP Auction the admissible graph g contains a forward arc 
( i, ]c) for each source i such that if i were to bid, it would bid for Jc, i.e., 
and for each sink j, g contains a reverse arc for each valid bid leveled with Pi, i.e., if 
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Pi(t) = bij· Now in distributed RAP, the reverse arcs are the same as flows continue to 
be reversed exactly as in RAP Auction i.e., when Pi(t) = bij· However in distributed 
RAP Auction, source i bids for sink j such that 
It is possible that Jc =J j since the prices are different. However, flow can be only be 
increased on ( i, j) if this bid is substantive i.e., Pi ( t) ~ bj + E/ cij. This along with 
(4.4) and (4.3), implies 
C· ·p. (t) > Vsec > Vsec. 
tJ J - - c 
where v~ec is the second best value computed using current prices rather than outdated 
prices as in (3.9). Hence sink j is not only the best with outdated prices but also 
with current prices i.e., Jc = j. Given that the admissible graphs have the same arcs, 
Lemma 3.2 holds which says that cycles if any are flow generating. 
Lemma 4.1 After processing a finite number of substantive bids, prices drop by at 
least Emin or the algorithm terminates. 
Proof: Assume the contrary and let ..6. = {t1 , t 2 , ... } be an infinite sequence 
times during which these substantive bids are processed. Without loss of generality, 
we assume that only one substantive bid is processed per time. Since bid processing 
across sinks is completely decoupled and sequential within sinks, this assumption can 
be easily relaxed by subdividing each time slot according to the number of substantive 
bids processed. Simply by re-indexing the time stamps of these bids from ..6. to 
A= {1, 2, ... , }, we can invoke Lemma 3.3 with only one change: replace "iteration" 
with "allocation procedure". Also for clarifications, U(t) is the true set of sources 
with surplus as defined in this chapter rather than just those with gi > 0. • 
Proposition 4.4 The asynchronous RAP Auction terminates in finite time. 
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Proof: We note the following: 
1. By definition ( 4.4) 
(4.5) 
2. Suppose a sink receives an infinite number of bids during the algorithm. Then, 
an infinite subset of these bids must be substantive; otherwise Pi(t) would stay 
constant for t sufficiently large, we would have Pi ( Tii ( t)) = Pi ( t) = Pi for t 
sufficiently large because old price information is eventually purged from the 
system (cf. Assumption 4.2), and in view of (4.5), we would have bi :::; Pi(t)-
E/ cii for all times t at which j receives a bid, arriving at a contradiction. 
Assume now, in order to obtain a contradiction, that the algorithm does not terminate 
finitely. Then, because of Assumption 4.1, there is an infinite number of times t at 
which R( t) is nonempty and at each of these times, at least one sink receives a bid. 
Thus, there is a nonempty subset of sink which receives an infinite number of bids. In 
view of (2) , a subset of these sinks receive infinite number of substantive bids. From 
lemma 4.1, price of at least one sink drop infinitely often by at least Emin· But this 
is a contradiction as the sequence Pi(t) is a non increasing sequence upper and lower 
bounded by cpi(O) < oo and cpi(l:=iEWj ciisi) 2: 0, respectively. • 
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Chapter 5 
Polynomial RAP Auction 
Apart from illustrating how principles of the auction algorithm can be used for solving 
RAP, RAP Auction is of little theoretical and practical utility. In this chapter, after 
illustrating the problems with RAP Auction, we propose a new algorithm which has 
pseudo polynomial complexity and fast empirical performance. 
5.1 Limitations of RAP Auction 
We first illustrate why RAP Auction can't have stronger complexity bounds. Prob-
lems in generalized networks are harder than their ordinary network counterparts 
because cycles in generalized networks can generate or absorb net flow. It is the pres-
ence of such flow generating cycles that prevents RAP Auction from having stronger 
complexity results than finite termination. As illustrated in Fig. 5·1, the complexity 
w T 
Figure 5·1: Impact of cyclic admissible graph. Assume at t we have 
this graph. In this iteration source 1 bids for sink 1 increasing x 11 by 91 
while reducing x 21 by 9 1 c 11 / c 21 . Next source 2 bids for sink 2 increas-
ing X22 by 91cn/c21 and reducing x12 by 91/ where 1 = c22cn/c21c12, 
the cycle gain. After k such circulations x 21 and x 12 are reduced by 
911k-l c11 / c21 and 91/k, respectively. This sequence continues until one 
of the reverse arcs saturates making the graph acyclic. Since 1 2:: 1, 
this happens in order 0(1/ 91) iterations. 
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of resolving such cycles though finite can be arbitrarily large. One way to resolve this 
problem is by cycle detection and saturation as proposed in [Tseng and Bertsekas, 
2000]. 
In RAP Auction, source prices are implicitly defined via the sink prices and hence 
allowed to change continuously with the sink prices. This allows the admissible graph 
to change continuously as well making it intractable to count the number of opera-
tions. It also means that every tirrie a source bids, it has to compute the best and 
second best values available to it. This can be avoided by having explicit source 
prices and introducing the concept of push lists/candidate lists as in previous E-CS 
techniques. 
Finally, the step sizes in RAP Auction are proportional to E which implies slow 
performance for high accuracy. The dependence of performance and complexity of 
all E-CS techniques is mitigated by E-scaling. It consists of applying the algorithm 
several times, starting with a large value of E and successively reducing E up to some 
final value € deemed sufficiently small. The starting solution for a given scaling phase 
is generated from the feasible solution of the previous scaling phase by recalling flows 
on arcs violating E-CS without changing the prices. This method can't be used by 
RAP Auction, as recalling flows creates deficits (negative surpluses) at sinks and RAP 
auction assumes that the starting solution satisfies flow constraints at sinks. 
5. 2 Forward Auction 
The forward auction is derived from RAP Auction to have explicitly source prices, 
push lists and cycle handing capability. This enables us to bound the number of basic 
operations. We now reintroduce the source prices, Jl-i, in the definition of E-CS. 
Definition 5.1 Given E 2::0, a flow-price quartet (x,z,JL, p) is said to satisfy E-CS 
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if x ~ 0, z ~ 0, and 
V{i,j}E£ 
CijPj ~ f-ti - E V { i, j} E £ with Xij > 0 
- Jf( zj ) "5: Pj "5: - fj-(zj) V j E T 
(5.la) 
(5.lb) 
(5.lc) 
In RAP Auction, during the bidding phase a source i with surplus bids for sink 
j offering it the best value i.e., j = arg maxjETi CijPj . This requires scanning all the 
sinks or maintaining a complicated data structure such a priority queue which have 
to be updated for every sink price drop. Rather than this, we now allows sources to 
bid on "nearly" the best arcs which are defined as: for any E > 0, any (3 E (0, 0.5), 
and flow-price quartet (x, z, J.L , p) satisfying E-CS, we say that an arc ( i, j) E £ is 
(3-best if 
(5.2) 
As shown in Fig. 5·2, (3-best arcs offer "almost" the best value (cijPj) to the source i 
and the maximum drop in sink price before violating E-CS, and thus are near-optimal 
arcs to allocate new flow on while preserving e-CS. For each source k its bid list, 
cijPj 
~ [3-Best arcs 
I 
lli __________ ! ______________ A.B E 
E 
r 
Figure 5·2: Visualization of E-CSarc and (3-best arcs. The entire blue 
region represents the flow-price pairs that satisfy E-CSarc· The upper 
darker strip represent flow-price pairs corresponding to an (3-best arcs. 
denoted as £+(k), is defined as the set of all (3-best outgoing arcs. 
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In RAP Auction, during the allocation phase, flow was reversed on arcs with bkj = 
P] to ensure that c-CS is not violated. However , these bid prices maybe have become 
outdated due to the changes in the sinks prices since this bid was accepted. Now that 
we have reintroduced source prices, we can reverse flows only when Pj = (f-tk- c)/ckj · 
An arc ( k, j) satisfies this relation if it lies on the lower boundary of the blue region 
in Figure 5·3 with Xkj > 0. Hence this arc offers the worst value to the source k 
among all the arcs which have received flow from it. However rather than checking 
this condition exactly, we allow sinks to reverse flow on "almost" the worst arcs which 
are defined as: for any flow-price quartet (x, z, J-L , p) satisfying c-CS, we say that an 
arc (k, j) E £ is {3 -worst if Xkj > 0 and 
(5.3) 
{3-worst arcs offer "almost" the worst value to source k and prevents the sink j from 
13-Worst arcs 
-------------1.8 € 
.. 
.. 
Figure 5·3: Visualization of c-CSarc and {3-worst arcs. The entire blue 
region represents the flow-price pairs that satisfy c-CSarc· The lower 
darker strip represent flow-price pairs corresponding to an {3-worst arcs. 
dropping its price significantly without violating e-CS. Thus they are near-optimal 
arcs to reverse flow on. 
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Since all flow changes are restricted to be on the ,8-best and worst arcs, the 
admissible graph is now defined as 
Q = {(i,j)J(i,j) E £is ,8-best} U {(j,i)J(i,j) E £is ,8-worst}. (5.4) 
In particular, for each ,8-best arc ( i, j) we introduce a forward arc ( i, j) in Q, and for 
each ,8-worst arc (i,j) we introduce a reverse arc (j,i) in Q. This admissible graph is 
not the same as for RAP Auction. However, the following lemma shows that cycles, 
if any, continue to be flow generating. 
Lemma 5.1 Cycles in admissible graph are flow generating, z.e, cycle gain > 1 
Proof: Let C be one such cycle in Q where C = (i1, j 1, i2, ... , Jm, im+l = il) and 
V k = 1, ... , m and (ik, Jk) E c+ are the ,8-best arcs while (ik+l, Jk) E c- are the 
,8-worst arcs. From (5·2) and (5.3), we have 
and 
So 
Cid1 > Pjm 
Cidm Pj1 
Cidk > Pjk-1 
cikjk-1 Pjk 
V k = 2, ... ,m 
• 
As in RAP Auction, the forward auction has two phases: Bidding and Allocation. 
During the bidding phase a source with surplus bids on its ,8-best arcs until all 
the surplus is exhausted. However if a cycle is detected during this phase, then to 
avoid large number of circulations as illustrated in Fig. 5·1, we introduce a special 
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step. Lemma 5.1 proved that all such cycles are flow generating. So it is possible to 
saturate cycles by pushing large enough flow into it. A 15-flow push along a cycle C 
increases (respectively, decreases) flow Xkt by a positive amount rckb for all forward 
arcs (k, l) E c+ (respectively, for all reverse arcs (k, l) E c-). A cycle is said to be 
saturated during such a flow push when one of its reverse arcs is saturated. Recall 
that a reverse arc is said to be saturated when its flow becomes zero. The minimum 
flow push to saturate a cycle C can be computed as 
and ck denotes the portion of c from i to k 0 
Bidding Phase: 
Select a source i E W with gi > 0; if no such source can be found, the bidding phase 
terminates. 
Step 1: (Choose a f)-best arc) If the bid list .c+(i) is empty, go to St ep 2. 
Otherwise, choose any f)-best arc, say ( i, j). Check if this arc is still f)-best, else 
remove it from the bid list and restart Step 1. If this arc belongs to some cycle C of 
the admissible graph g, go to Step 3b. Otherwise go to Step 3a. 
Step 2: (Update price of source i) Drop J-li to the level 
(5.5) 
and populate the bid list of i. If gi > 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3a: (Bid for sink j) Increase Xij by gi, set gi = 0 and set the bid price of this 
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flow to 
if I.C+(i)j > 1 
(5.6) 
else 
where 
{ 
maxkE7i\i CikPk if I Ti\j I > 0 
Vsec = 
0 else 
Run allocation phase at sink j. Check if (i,j) is still ,8-best, else remove it from 
.c+(i). Now if .c+(i) = 0 go to Step 2. If 9i > 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3b: (Push a-flow along cycle C), where 
Update 9i = 9i +be- l)o and go to Step 1. 
A sink which receives a bid, now has a surplus 9i = Cij9~ where g~ denotes the surplus 
at source i before executing Step 3a. This source surplus is accepted via absorption 
or reversal or a combination of them during the allocation phase. 
Allocation Phase: 
Step 1: (Choose a ,8-worst arc) If the reject list of sink j, .c+(j) , is empty, go to 
Step 2. Otherwise, choose any ,8-worst arc, say (k,j). Check if it's still ,8-worst, else 
remove this arc from the reject list and restart Step 1. Go to Step 3. 
Step 2: (Update price of sink j) Drop Pi to the level 
(5.7) 
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while absorbing flow llz = min{gj, <I>j(Pj)- Zj}· So the demand increases to Zj = 
Zj + llz and surplus reduces to gj = gj - llz. If the cumulative price drop since the 
last iteration when its reject list was computed is substantive i.e., Pj - Pj > /3Emin 
where Pj denotes the price at which current reject list was computed, then rebuild 
the reject list. If pj < bi + (3Ej cij, then add ( i, j) to the reject list . If gj = 0 stop; else 
go to Step 1. 
Step 3: (Reverse flow along arc (k , j)) Decrease Xkj by 8 = min{gj/Cij,Xkj}, 
decrease gj = gj- Cijo, and increase 9k = 9k + 8. If now gj = 0 stop; else go to Step 
1. 
At the sink there are two notions of price drops: one is the difference between previous 
price and current price while cumulative price drop is the difference between the sink 
price at which the current reject list was computed and the current sink price. A 
price drop at a source (sink, respectively) is substantive if it is at least (3E (f3Emin, 
respectively). 
Note that during the allocation phase, the (3-best arc (i, j) on which the bid was 
received, may end up becoming a (3-worst arc due to price drop at sink j during 
absorption. In such a case, we say that the forward arc is saturated. One of the 
scenarios when a forward arc ( i, j) is saturated is when sink j is unable to accept all 
the surplus being bid to it by source i as at the end of such an allocation phase we 
have pj = bi. We refer to this particular scenario as saturated bid from source ito j. 
A saturated bid results in a substantive price drop at sink j. Also non substantive 
bids are exhausting (surplus of the bidding source becomes zero). 
The way the algorithm has been defined, each bidding phase may result in mul-
titude of bids to different sinks until the source is exhausted. This constitutes one 
iteration of the forward auction. Each iteration consists of at least one bid and at · 
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least one allocation phase. We make the following observations about these iterations. 
1. The iterations preserve E-CS and the prices are monotonically non-increasing. 
The source price update step (5.5) is the lowest E-CS satisfying price. When 
bi = (J-Li- E)/cij, sink price update (5.7) also preserves E-CS as Pj 2:: (J-Lk- E)/ckj 
for all k. So E-CS is preserved for all preexisting and current flow. However if 
bi = (vsec- E)/cij, then it is possible that sink price update (5.7) may violate 
E-CS on arc ( i, j). If this happens ( bi ::; Pj < (J-Li - E)/ Cij), then after returning 
from the allocation phase in Step 3a of the bidding phase, the bid list £+(i) is 
empty and Step 2 is called, which immediately rectifies this by dropping /-Li to 
max{ Vsec' CijPj }. 
2. Every source price drop is substantive. However, this may not be true for sinks. 
Source and sinks drop their prices when their bid and reject lists, respectively, 
are empty. In case of sources, prices are dropped until the bid lists become 
non-empty. While sinks drop prices either until reject lists become non-empty 
or surpluses get exhausted by absorption, whichever happens sooner. However, 
note that reject lists are only computed after substantive cumulative sink price 
drops. 
3. Every iteration preserves flow conservation at sinks i.e., (3.lc) if the initial 
solution has this property. This is because at the end of allocation phase, sink 
surplus is zero. 
4. If any source or sink in a given iteration performs flow pushes on multiple 
arcs, then all but the last are saturating. Flow pushes collectively refers to all 
possible arc flow changes in the algorithm such as sources biding to sinks on {3-
best arcs, sources pushing flow into cycles to saturate them, and sinks reversing 
flows on (3-worst arcs. This is simply because non saturating flow pushes (both 
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non saturating bids and reversals) are exhausting. Also a flow push in a cycle, 
results in saturation of at least one {3-worst arc. 
In general, finding the cycle C in Step 1 of bidding phase is expensive. However, 
due to observation 4, such a cycle can be found without excessive overhead by growing 
a path as opposed to growing a tree. We propose the following method of choosing 
sources during the bidding phase to facilitate cycle detection. 
(a) Select any source i 0 with positive surplus. If no such node exists, terminate the 
method. Else let k = 0 and go to (b). 
(b) Perform a bidding iteration at ik. If there are any changes in the admissible 
graph (happens if there are any saturated flow pushes or source price drops or 
substantive cumulative sink price drops) then go to (a) else let j denote the unique 
sink being bid for and i denote the source to which flow has been reversed during 
the allocation iteration at j. If there is no flow reversal, then go to (a). Set 
Jk = j. If i = i 1 for some l < k, go to (c). Else let ik+l = i, increment k by 1 and 
go to (b). 
(c) A cycle whose forward arcs are all {3-best and whose reverse arcs are all {3-worst 
5.2.1 Termination of forward auction 
We have already shown that each source price drop is substantive. Since the prices are 
constrained to be nonnegative, hence there can only be finite many price drops. By 
analyzing changes in the admissible graph, we have the following proposition which 
bounds the number of operations between successive source price drops. 
Proposition 5.1 The number of flow pushes along arcs {respectively, cycles) between 
two successive source price drops (not necessarily at the same source) is at most 
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N 2 (2A + MC I (3) (respectively, 2A} while the number of substantive and non substan-
tive cumulative sink price drops are at most MC I (3 and N A, respectively where 
C = max c; ·I min ci · (i,j)E£ J (i,j)E£ J 
Proof: Consider the iterations between two successive source price drops. Fixed 
source prices along with E-CS, implies that the cumulative drop in each of the sink 
prices cannot be greater than Emax as for a sink receiving bid, we must have ~-td cij 2::: 
Pi 2::: J-ti - cl Cij where 
Emax = cl min Cij. 
(i,j)E£ 
Hence the number of substantive cumulative price drops per sink is bounded by 
Emaxl (3Emin = C I (3 · 
Since source prices are fixed, their bid lists are non increasing and every saturated 
bid strictly removes an arc from a bid list and introduces it into a reject list. On 
the other hand, a saturated flow reversal on a reverse arc removes it once and for 
all from the admissible graph for the remaining iterations as to go from (3-worst to 
(3-best requires a source price change of at least (1 - 2(3)E > 0. Hence each arc can 
participate in at most two saturated flow pushes: first as a forward arc and then as a 
reverse arc. Hence we have that the number of saturating flow pushes is at most 2A. 
This is the bound on total number of saturated flow pushes between two successive 
source price drops including flow pushes in cycles which are all saturating. 
Now consider the iterations between two successive saturating flow pushes. All 
the bids in these iterations are exhausting as they are non saturating. Hence each 
iteration here consists of single bid and single allocation phase. Also during the 
allocation phase, there can be at most one flow reversal due to observation 4. Hence 
the number of sources with surplus is non increasing. However, every non substantive 
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cumulative sink price drop decreases this number by one. Thus there can be at most 
N non substantive cumulative price drops between two saturating flow pushes. 
Between two successive source price changes, the admissible graph Q changes only 
when there are saturated flow pushes or substantive cumulative sink price drops. So 
the number of times Q changes is bounded by 2A + M C I (3. Now consider the iterations 
when Q is unchanging. Each flow pull along an arc, being non saturating, does not 
increase the number of sources with surplus. By the logic of the bidding iterations, 
the sources belong to a cycle are iterated on only once before the cycle is detected. 
Thus, there can be at most 2N flow pushes ( N flow pushes each from sources to sinks 
and sinks to sources) along arcs belonging to cycles of Q. There remains to estimate 
the number of flow pushes along arcs not belonging to any cycle of Q. These arcs form 
an acyclic directed graph, say Q*. Moreover, the bidding process can repeat a source 
say i if there is a path in Q* pointing into i from another source where a bidding 
iteration was performed earlier. Since any forward path in Q* has length at most 
2(N- 1) (so the surplus of a source can be propagated to successors sources along 
the arcs of Q* by at most 2(N- 1) flow pushes) and originally at most N sources 
have surplus, this implies that the total number of flow pushes along arcs in Q* is at 
most 2(N- 1)N. 
Thus, between two successive source price drops, the admissible graph can change 
at most 2A + M C I (3 times and, between successive changes in the admissible graph, 
there are at most N 2 flow pushes along arcs. 
• 
With this result, we have finite termination of forward auction in a near optimal 
feasible solution provided the initial solution (x0 , z0 , JL0 , p 0 ) satisfies E-CS, sink flow 
conservation (3.1c) and all the source surpluses are non-negative. One possible initial 
solution can be computed as follows: 
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• Pick (x0 ,z0 ,p0 ) using (3.7) as in RAP Auction. 
• Set J.L0 as 
ViEW. 
5. 3 Reverse Auction 
In forward auction, iterations are performed only on sources with surplus. This 
requires all the sources must have non negative surpluses in the initial solution. If 
any of the sources have deficits (negative surplus), then forward auction will simply 
ignore them. While it will terminate, it may not terminate with a feasible solution. 
Now consider the opposite scenario, where sources have deficits. Deficits at source 
arise due to overallocation of flow on arcs beyond their supplies. To handle this case, 
we need a reverse algorithm where sources with deficits withdraw flow from sinks. 
This can be also seen as allocation of deficits to sinks as opposed to surpluses during 
forward auction. A sink receiving a deficit can try to absorb it by reducing its demand 
and hence raising its price. In this section, we propose such an algorithm called reverse 
auction. Though it may seem like reverse auction is a purely theoretical exercise, we 
will illustrate how the combination of forward and reverse auction can handle a more 
generalized set of initial solutions where sources may have surplus or deficit. The 
most important application of this capability will be in the realization of E-scaling. 
During the bidding phase at a source i with deficit, it has to pick arcs on which 
to bid this deficit. Among all the arcs on which it has allocated flow, ,6-worst arcs 
are among those offering it the lowest value and possibility of largest E-CS preserving 
sink price rise as shown in Figure 5·4. Hence they are near-optimal candidates for 
deficit push (negative flow push). Now the set of all ,6-worst arcs constitutes the bid 
list c-( i) for source i. 
During the allocation phase, the presence of ,6-best arcs prevents the sink j from 
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13-Worst arcs 
~i ~-----+---------
---------------1,8 E 
'k ·p. J J 
~-Best arcs 
~k _________________________ J,B E 
E 
Figure 5·4: Visualization arcs constituting the bid list and reject list 
for reverse auction. All the arcs in the lower dark strip constitute the 
bid list of source i while the arcs in the upper dark region constitute 
the reject list of sink j 
raising its prices significantly to absorb the deficit allocated to it as shown in Figure 
5·4. Hence, the deficit is reversed (flow is pulled) on these arcs. The set of all such 
,8-best arcs constitutes the reject list £ - (j) of the sink j. 
Since all flow changes due to deficit pushes are restricted to be on the ,8-best and 
worst arcs, the admissible graph is now defined as 
Q = {(i,j) l(j,i) E £is ,8-best} U {(i, j)l(i,j) E £is ,8-worst} . (5.8) 
In particular, for each ,8-best arc ( i, j) we introduce a reverse arc (j, i ) in Q, and for 
each ,8-worst arc (i,j) we introduce a forward arc (i,j) in Q. Unlike the different 
admissible graphs we have seen until now, this graph captures the possible deficit 
pushes as opposed to flow pushes. The role of ,8-best and worst arcs has been swapped 
as compared to that in forward auction. This swapping has the following impact of 
t he cycles in t he admissible graph. 
Lemma 5.2 Cycles in admissible graph are flow absorbing , i.e, cycle gain < 1 
Proof: Let C be one such cycle in Q where C = (i1 , JI, i2, . . . , Jm, im+l = i1 ) and 
't/ k = 1, . .. , m and (ik,Jk) E c + are the ,8-worst arcs while (ik+l,j,c) E c -are the 
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,8-best arcs. From (5·2) and (5.3), we have 
and 
So 
Cid1 < Pim 
cidm Pi1 
Cikik < Pik-1 V k = 2, ... ,m 
Cikik-1 Pik 
• 
Reverse auction has two phases: Bidding and Allocation. During the bidding 
phase a source with deficits bids on its ,8-worst arcs until all the deficit is exhausted. 
However if a cycle is detected during this phase, then to avoid large number of cir-
culations, we have a special step. So when such a cycle is found, deficit is pushed 
till either the cycle saturates or the source is exhausted whichever happens earlier. 
A 6-deficit push along a cycle C decreases (respectively, increases) flow xkl by a pos-
itive amount 'Yckb" for all forward arcs (k, l) E c+ (respectively, for all reverse arcs 
(k, l) E c-). A cycle is said to be saturated during such a deficit push when flow in 
one of its forward arcs becomes zero. The minimum deficit push to saturate a cycle 
C can be computed as 
Bidding Phase: 
Select a source i E W with gi < 0; if no such source can be found, the bidding phase 
terminates. 
Step 1: (Choose a ,8-worst arc) If the bid is list .c-(i) is empty, go to Step 2. 
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Otherwise, choose any /3-worst arc, say (i,j). Check if this arc is still /3-worst, else 
remove it from the bid list and restart Step 1. If this arc belongs to some cycle C of 
the admissible graph Q, go to Step 3b. Otherwise go to Step 3a. 
Step 2: (Update price of source i) Raise /-li to the level 
(5.9) 
and populate the bid list of i. If gi < 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3a: (Bid for sink j) Decrease Xij by o where o =min{ -gi, Xij}, increase gi 
by o, and set the bid price of this flow to 
(5.10) 
else 
where 
{
minkE{7i\.ilx;k>O} cikPk + E if lfli\Jixik > O}l > 0 
Vsec = 
CijPmax else 
Here Pmax 6 maxjET inf Pi. Run allocation phase at sink j which now has deficit 
gj = -Cijo. Check if (i,j) is still /3-worst, else remove it from .c-(i). Now if .c-(i) = 0 
go to Step 2. If gi < 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3b: (Push o-deficit along cycle C), where 
Update gi = gi + (1- !c)o. If gi < 0, go to Step 1. 
A sink from which receives a bid, now has a deficit. It can accept this deficit by 
absorption or reversal during allocation phase. 
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Allocation Phase: 
Step 1: (Choose a f)-best arc) If the reject list of sink j, .c-(j), is empty, go to 
Step 2. Otherwise, choose from the reject list any f)-best arc, say (k, j). Check if it's 
still f)-best, else remove this arc from the reject list and restart Step 1. Go to Step 3. 
Step 2: (Increase price of sink j) Increase Pi to the level 
(5.11) 
while withdrawing flow !:1z = min{ -gi, zi - ci>i(Pi)}. So the demands reduces to 
zi = zi - !:1z and 9i = 9i + !:1z . If the cumulative price rise since the last iteration 
when its reject list was computed is substantive, then rebuild the reject list. If 
Pi > bi - j)E/ cii, then add ( i, j) to the reject list. If now 9i = 0 stop; else go to Step 
1. 
Step 3: (Reverse deficit along arc (k,j)) Increase xki by -gi/cki, set 9k 
9k + 9i/cki and set gi = 0. 
During the allocation phase, the f)-worst arc (i, j) on which the bid was received, 
is said to be saturated if its flow becomes zero or if the sink j's price rise makes it 
f)-best. f)-best arcs, if any, may only have their flow increased during the allocation 
phase, so there is no notion of saturation for them. 
The way the algorithm has been defined, each bidding phase may result in mul-
titude of bids to different sinks until the source is exhausted. This constitutes one 
iteration of the reverse auction. Each iteration consists of at least one bid and at least 
one allocation phase. We make the following observations about these iterations. 
1. The iterations preserve E-CS and the prices are monotonically non-decreasing. 
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The source price update step (5.9) is the highest E-CS satisfying price. When 
bi = ~-tdcii, sink price update (5.11) also preserves E-CS as Pi ::; f-tk/cki for all 
k. So E-CS is preserved for all preexisting flows. However if bi = Vsec/ cii , then 
it is possible that sink price update (5.11) may violate E-CS on arc (i,j). If this 
happens ( bi 2: Pi > ~-td cii), then after returning from the allocation phase in 
Step 3a of the bidding phase, the bid list .c-( i) is empty and Step 2 is called, 
which immediately rectifies this by raising f-ti to min{ Vsec, ciiPi + E }. 
2. Every source price rise is substantive. This is not true for the sinks. However, 
note that bid and reject lists are only computed after substantive price rises. 
3. Every iteration preserves flow conservation at sinks i.e., (3.lc) if the initial 
solution has this property. This is because at the end of allocation phase, sink 
deficit is zero. 
4. If any source bids on multiple arcs in a given iteration, then all but the last are 
saturating. This is because non saturating bids are exhausting. A sink can only 
perform at most one deficit reversal on a reverse arc and reverse arcs are never 
saturated. Also a flow push in a cycle, results either saturation or exhausting. 
We propose the following method of choosing sources during the bidding phase to 
facilitate cycle detection. 
(a) Select any source i 0 with deficit. If no such node exists, terminate the method. 
Else let k = 0 and go to (b). 
(b) Perform a bidding iteration at Zk. If there are any changes in the admissible 
graph (happens if there are any saturated bids or source price rises or substantive 
cumulative sink price rises) then go to (a) else let j denote the unique sink being 
bid for and i denote the source to which deficit was reversed during the allocation 
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phase at j. If there is no such deficit reversal, then go to (a). Set jk = j. If i = i 1 
for some l < k, go to (c). Else let ik+l = i, increment k by 1 and go to (b). 
(c) A cycle whose forward arcs are all /3-worst and whose reverse arcs are all /3-best 
5.3.1 Termination of reverse auction 
We have already shown that each source price rise is substantive. Since source prices 
are bounded between zero and maxiE7i cij<I>j(zJ) where z0 is the initial demand vector, 
there can only be finite many price rises. By analyzing changes in the admissible 
graph, we have the following proposition which bounds the number of operations 
between successive source price rises. In this preposition, flow pulls collectively refers 
to all flow changes in the algorithm such as sources bidding to sinks on /3-worst arcs, 
sources pushing deficit into cycles, and sinks reversing deficits on /3-best arcs. 
Proposition 5.2 The number of flow pulls along arcs {respectively,cycles) between 
two successive source price rises {not necessarily at the same source) is at most 
N 2 (A + MC I /3) {respectively, N(A + MC I /3)) while the number of substantive and 
non substantive cumulative sink price rises are at most MC I /3 and N A. 
Proof: Consider the iterations between two successive source price rises. Fixed 
source prices along with E-CS, implies that number of substantive cumulative price 
rises per sink is Emaxl /3Emin = C I /3 (can be derived exactly along the lines of Propo-
sition 5.1 by switching "drops" with "rises"). 
Since source prices are fixed, their bid lists are non increasing and every saturated 
bid strictly removes an arc from this list. So the number of saturating flow pulls is 
at most A. This is the bound on total number of saturated flow pulls between two 
successive source price rises including saturating flow pulls in cycles. 
Between two successive source price changes, the admissible graph Q changes only 
when there are saturated flow pulls or substantive cumulative sink price rises. So the 
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number of times 9 changes is bounded by A+ MC //3. Now consider the iterations 
when 9 is unchanging. Each flow pull along an arc, being non saturating, does not 
increase the number of sources with deficits, while each flow pull along a cycle, being 
non saturating, decreases this number by one. Thus, there can be at most N flow 
pulls along cycles. The bound on number of flow pulls on arcs 2(N- 1)N can be 
derived exactly along the lines of Proposition 5.1 by switching "pushes" with "pulls" 
and "surplus" with "deficit". 
Thus, between two successive source price rises, the admissible graph can change 
at most A+ MC //3 times and, between successive changes in the admissible graph, 
there are at most N 2 flow pulls along arcs and N flow pulls from cycles. 
• 
With this result, we have finite termination of reverse auction in a near opt imal 
feasible solution provided the initial solution (x0 , z0 , 11°, p 0 ) satisfies E-CS, sink flow 
conservation (3.1c) and all the source surpluses are non-positive. 
5.4 E-Scaling 
In this section, we will illustrate how the performance of our algorithms can be im-
proved by E-scaling. It consists of applying the algorithms several times, starting 
with a large value of E and successively reducing E up to some final value E deemed 
sufficiently small. The value of E used for the (k + 1)st scaling phase is denoted by 
Ek. The sequence of Ek is generated by 
Ek+ 1 = Ek I(), k = 0, 1, ... 
where E0 is a suitably chosen starting value of E, and () > 1. Then the total number 
of such scaling phases is O(ln( E0 /E)) where final value E deemed sufficiently small. 
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5.4.1 Generating the starting solution 
As highlighted in the beginning of this chapter, generation of the starting solution 
for a given scaling phase from the feasible solution of the previous phase is not as 
trivial as recalling flows on arcs violating E-CS as it introduces deficits are sinks. 
There are different ways to handle sink deficits as we saw in the allocation phase of 
reverse auction: either the sinks can absorb them by raising prices or transfer them 
to sources. Deficits at sources can be exhausted by applying the reverse auction. 
Let (xk, zk, JLk, pk) be the flow-price quartet obtained at the kth scaling phase. 
Then {xk,zk} is feasible and satisfies Ek-CS with (JLk,pk). To start the (k + l)th 
scaling phase, we need a starting solution which satisfies Ek+1-CS. We propose the 
following procedure to generate such a starting point. 
Generate starting solution for k + 1 stage from (xk, zk, JLk, pk): 
Step 1: Recall flow on all the arcs which violate Ek+l_CS. This introduces deficits at 
a set of sinks, say, T. For each sink j E T, let wi denote the set of sources which 
·have recalled flow from it. Assume that sources in Wi are sorted in descending order 
of (J-ti - Ek+l) I cii. 
Step 2: For each sink jET, 
• Compute Pi = miniEWj J-td cii and let i denote any one of the arguments this 
minimization. This is an E-CS satisfying upper bound on Pi. 
• For each source i E Wi such that (J-ti - Ek+ 1) I cii :::; p: 
- Raise price: Pi= min{(J-ti- Ek+l)lcii, ei(zi + 9i)} while withdrawing flow 
b..z =min{ -gi, zi- <l>i(Pi)}. So the demands reduces to zi = zi - b.. z and 
9i = 9i + b..z. If 9i is zero, exit. 
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- Reclaim recalled flow: Since Pi = (J-Li - Ek+l) I Cii, Ek+l_CS is satisfied on 
(i,j). Increase Xii by 8 = min{gi, -gi/cii} reducing gi = gi + cii8 and 
9i = 9i - 8. If gi is zero, exit. 
• If still gi < 0, 
- Raise price: Pi = min{pi, 8i(zi + gi)} while withdrawing flow ~z = 
min{ -gi, zi - <I>i(Pi)}. So the demands reduces to zi = zi - ~z and 
gi = gi + ~z. If gi is zero, exit. 
- Transfer deficit to source i: Increase Xij by - 9i I cii, set 9i = 9i - gi I cii and 
gi = 0. Exit. 
We make the following observations about this procedure. 
1. The output of this procedure satisfies Ek+l_CS. Step 1 ensures this by recalling 
all flow on arcs which violate it and Step 2 preserves this property. 
2. All the sinks have zero deficits while the sources may have surpluses or deficits. 
Step 2 may transfer the deficits from the sinks to the sources. 
3. Source prices are unchanged. 
4. The computation complexity of this procedure is O(A). 
The procedure to generate starting solution takes the feasible Ek-CS solution to 
generate a starting solution for next scaling phase such that there is flow conserva-
tion at the sinks but the sources may have surpluses or deficits. Now we can use 
the forward and reverse auction algorithms to exhaust the surpluses and deficits. We 
propose the following E-scaling. 
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Polynomial RAP Auction 
Initialization: Choose E > 0 and any c-CS satisfying flow-price quartet (x, z , JL , p ). 
Fix any scalar e E (0, 1). 
First phase: Repeatedly choose a source i with positive surplus and run the forward 
auction algorithm. 
Second phase: Repeatedly choose a node i with negative surplus gi and run the 
reverse auction algorithm. 
€-Scaling. If E is below a desired tolerance, terminate. Otherwise, scale E by e. Run 
the procedure to generate starting solution for next scaling phase. Return to First 
phase. 
To show finite termination of a given scaling phase in a feasible solution, we make 
additional observations about forward auction iterations: 
• Once the surplus of a source becomes non negative, it remains non negative for 
all subsequent forward iterations. The reason is that a flow push from a source 
cannot make its surplus negative and cannot decrease the surplus of any other 
source. So no new deficit can be introduced by forward iterations. 
• If at some iteration a source has deficit (negative surplus), then its price must 
be equal to its initial price. This is a consequence of above observation and the 
fact that price rises occur only on sources with positive surplus. 
Due to these properties, the first phase terminates with a c-CS satisfying solution 
where none of the sources have positive surplus. We have analogous properties for 
the reverse auction iterations which enable us to conclude that the second phase 
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terminates with a feasible E-CS satisfying solution as no new surplus can be introduced 
during reverse iterations. 
For a path P in (W, T, £) with a set of sources Wp and starting node s, denote 
(5.12) 
where Pi denotes the portion of path P from s to source i. This is the sum of the 
cumulative path gains from s to each of the sources in P. The following proposition 
bounds the total number of price drops and rises for forward and reverse auction, 
respectively, in terms of r p and other network parameters during a scaling phase 
starting for the source price vector J.L0 = J.Lk. 
Proposition 5.3 Let () be any nonnegative scalar such that the initial source price 
vector J.L0 for RAP Auction satisfies {}E-CS together with some feasible flow vector 
x 0 and price vector p0 . Then, forward and reverse RAP Auction perform at most 
((() + 1)f- 1)//3 price drops and ((() + 1)(2f- 1))//3 price rises at each source, 
respectively, where 
r := max r1-£ + r1i max { ( fc ) } 1-l:simple path C:simple cycle with ?c < 1 1 - rC 
where 111., !c, f11., fc are given by (3.13) and (5.12). 
Proof: Consider the flow-price triple (x, J.L, p) at the beginning of a forward 
iteration. Note that we allow of both positive and negative source surpluses. Now 
consider the flow x 0 - x. Since x 0 is feasible, the divergence of a source node is 
-gi while that of all the sinks is zero. As RAP can be formulated as a st andard 
generalized network problem (as in Section 2.4.4), we can apply the the conformal 
realization theorem [Tseng and Bertsekas, 2000] to x0 -x. From this theorem for each 
source s with g5 > 0, there a node t and a simple path 1-l from s to t that conforms 
t 0 . ox - x , I.e., 
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Xij < x?j, 'tf (i,j) E 1-£+, 
Xij > x?j, 'tf (i, j) E 1-l-. 
Moreover, either tis a node with gt < 0 or belongs to a simple cycle with lc < 1 and 
conforming to x 0 - x. We can further specialize this result based on the following 
observations: 
• Sinks have zero divergence as both x and x 0 satisfy (3.1c) with their corre-
sponding demands z and z0 , respectively. 
• The cycles include those introduced at the sinks during the transformation to 
standard problem in Fig. 2·6. If t is a sink connected to such a cycle, then it 
simply implies Zt < zf. With this condition, we can ignore these cycles for rest 
of the discussion. 
So we have the following possibilities: either t is a source with gt < 0, or a sink with 
Zt < z~ or t belongs to a simple cycle (not artificially introduced) with lc < 1 and 
conforming to x0 - x. 
Since the triple (x, JL , p) satisfies e-CS and the triple (x0 , JL0 , p 0 ) satisfies Be-CS, 
we have 
00 > II · - r - ·p · . > 0 and Be> 11°- r- -p~- > 0 't/ (i,J") E 1-£+ or c+, 
- t-"1 '--'!) 1) - - t-"1 '--'!) 1) - ' 
e > II · - c· ·p ·. > 0 and 00 > ~~~- C· ·p0 - > 0 't/ (i, J.) E 1-l- or c-. 
- t-"1 1) 1) - - t-"1 1) 1) - ' 
Combining these equations, we obtain 
11-- c· -p· > ~~~- c· -p~- Be 
t-"1 1) J - t-"1 1) J ' 
< 0 0 11 - - c··p· 11. - c · ·p - + e t-"1 1) J - t-"1 1) J ' 
't/ (i, j) E 1-£+ or c+, 
't/ (i,j) E 1-l- or c-. 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
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If tis a source, then 1-l is of the form (s = i 1 ,j1 , i 2 , ... , im = t) where m > 0 and 
• fork= 1, ... ,m -1, (ikljk) E 1-£+ and 
• if m > 1, then fork= 1, ... , m -1, (ik+1,jk) E 1-l-. 
Applying the inequalities (5.13) and (5.14) for all arcs of the path 1-l, we get 
If 9t < 0, then f.-lt = f-l~· So we have 
1-ls > 11~-{(B+1)r1l-811l-1}E 
> l1~-{(8+1)r-1}E. 
(5.15) 
However if source t belongs to a flow absorbing cycle, then applying the inequalities 
(5.13) and (5.14) for all arcs of the cycle C, we get 
11t- /cl1t ~ 1-l~- !el-l~- {(B + l)rc- B1c- 1} E. 
Using /c < 1, we obtain 
0 ( B + 1 )r c - B1c - 1 /-lt ~ 11t - E. 
1- /c 
Combining (5.15) and (5.16) 
11s > 11~- {(B + 1)r1l- 1} E- !1l (B + 1)(rc- 1) E 
1- /c 
> 11~-{(8+1)r-1}E. 
(5.16) 
If t is a sink, then applying the inequalities (5.13) and (5.14) for all arcs of the 
path 1-l from s to t, we get 
11s- !1lPt ~ 11~- !HP~- {(B + 1)r1l -1} E. 
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If Zt < z2, then from monotonicity of <I?t we have Pt 2: p~ and if it belongs to a flow 
absorbing cycle C, we have by applying (5.13) and (5.14) to all the arcs 
o (B + l)rc 
Pt 2: Pt - 1 E 
- 'Yc 
Combining the above equations, 
J-ls 2: p,~- {(B + 1)r -1} E. 
Since prices can only decrease in during forward auction, we trivially have p,~ 2: 1-ls· 
So for all i E W, 
(5.17) 
Since every price drop is substantial, the number of drops per source cannot be more 
than ((B + 1)r -1)/(3. 
Now we estimate the number of price rises on each source. Let (p, 1 , p 1) denote 
the price vector at the end of the forward auction. Consider the triple (x, z, p) at the 
beginning of a reverse auction iteration. From conformal realization theorem to flow 
x - x 0 , we have that for each source s with -g8 > 0, there is a simple path 1-l from 
s to a node t that confirms to x - x 0 . Morover, either t belongs to a simple cycle C 
confirming to x- x 0 with 'Yc < 1 or t is a sink node where Zt > z2. (There are no 
nodes with gt > 0.) By applying the inequalities (5.13) and (5.14) for all arcs along 
such paths, we get 
J-ls < p,~+{(B+1)r-B}E 
< p,; + {(B + 1)(2r- 1)} E. 
The last relation follows from (5.17). Since source prices can only increase, we trivially 
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have 
J-L!:::; 1-Ls:::; J-L! + {(0 + 1)(2r- 1)} E. 
So the number of price rises at each source are bounded by { (0 + 1)(2r- 1)} / {3. • 
It follows from Propositions 5.1 and 5.3 that the forward auction in each scaling 
phase, except the first, terminates after at most O(Nr) source price drops, O(AfC) 
substantive sink price drops, O(N3 Af+N2 AC) flow pushes along arcs, and O(N2 Ar) 
flow pushes along cycles. Similarly the reverse phase terminates after at most O(Nr) 
source price rises, O(AfC) substantive sink price rise, O(N3 Ar + N 2 AC) flow pulls 
along arcs, and O(N2 Ar +NArC) flow pulls along cycles. 
To show that these bounds hold for the first scaling phase as well, we have to 
provide a feasible Eo-CS satisfying flow price triple (x0 , JL0 , p 0). This is the input to 
the first scaling phase. We can generate this triple as follows: Set the source prices 
as 
(5.18) 
For each source i, let Ji denote any one sink that is the argument of the above 
maximization. Then set the flows as 
O { Si, if j = Ji 
xii = 
0, else 
(5.19) 
z0 and p 0 are computed using 3.1c and 3.5. For E0 large enough, (x0 , /.L0 , p 0 ) is a 
feasible Eo-CS flow price triple. 
5.4.2 Comparison with E-Relaxation 
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, the best known network flow based bounds for RAP are 
obtained by transforming RAP into a min-cost flow problem and using E-relaxation 
to solve it . The bounds per scaling phase on the number of prices rises (sources and 
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sinks) is O((N + M)f), flow pushes on arcs is O((N + M) 3Af), and flow pushes 
in cycles is O((N + M)2 Af) while the bounds on the number of prices drops is 
O((N + M)f2), flow pulls on arcs is O((N + M) 3 Af2 ) , and flow pulls in cycles is 
O((N + M)2Af2) where 
A { ( rc ) } r :=c. max r1i + !1i max . 
1i:simple path C:simple cycle with 'YC < 1 1 - /C 
So this algorithm terminates in feasible E-CS (not the same as our definition (5.1)) 
satisfying solution x* which is "near" optimal with a bound on duality gap E L(i,j) Jx;i I 
where the summation is over all arcs: both original (between sources and sinks) and 
artificial (between sinks and the artificially introduced flow absorbing cycle). This 
bound is clearly larger than our bound (3.1) i.e., Es'l. Another signficant difference 
between the bounds on duality gap is that our bound is independent of arc gains 
while this is not true for E-relaxation as the flows on artificial arcs depend on the 
gains. This means that for a given E, our algorithm which achieve a higher accuracy. 
So we expect that E-relaxation will need more scaling phases over our algorithm for 
achieving comparable accuracy. 
5.5 Simulations 
We have developed a suite using Xcode 4.5.2 for benchmarking the performance of our 
algorithms. This is available at http: I /iss. bu. edu/dac/dac/Software/Software. 
html. It includes 
• RAPGen: A generator for generating random instances of large RAPs. The 
logic for generating the underlying bipartite graph is identical to that used by 
NETGENG [Hultz, 1976] for generating transportation problems. 
• RAPAuction: Implementation of polynomial RAP Auction. 
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• RWOA: Our implementation of RWOA which was discussed in Section 2.4.2. 
• SIMPLX: Our implementation of a simplex type algorithm for RAP proposed 
in [Washburn, 1995]. 
• CVX: CVX is a Matlab based convex modeling framework. CVX was configured 
to use the convex solver from Mosek which is the state-of-art interior point based 
solver. 
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, RAP can to be transformed into a min-cost flow problem 
in generalized networks by introducing artificial nodes and flow absorbing cycles. 
RAPGen can perform this transformation on the generated RAPs. For min-cost flow 
problems, publicly shared Fortran routine ERELAXG was demonstrated to be one 
of the fastest techniques [Guerriero and Tseng, 2002]. However, ERELAXG assumes 
that the prices are non negative and that the derivative of arc cost functions is zero 
for zero flow. So it initializes all the node prices to zero. However, this is no longer 
true for the monotonic cost functions at sinks in RAP. So we modify the initialization 
of prices to 
0 if k is an artificially introduced node 
Pk = V' /j(O) if k is a sink 
-oo if k is a source 
Table 5.1 lists the solutions times for solving randomly generated symmetric i.e., 
M = N, search problems, as discussed in Section.2.2.1, on MacBook Air 5.2 running 
OS X 10.8.2 operating system. In these problems the cost functions are exponential 
101 
where Vj are uniformly distributed on (0 , 1). The source supply is uniformly dis-
tributed on (1, TSUP/N] where the parameter TSUP, inherited from NETGENG, 
was set to 2.5 * M . When supplies are small, the cost function is essentially linear. 
On the other hand with very large supplies, the objective becomes the maximization 
of the minimum demand. Our selection of supply size is designed to avoid these linear 
extremes. For ERELAXG and RAPAuction, ACCUR = 4 for roughly 4 digits of ac-
curacy. ERELAXG was unable to achieve higher accuracy due to machine precision. 
The RWOA was terminated to roughly achieve the same precision. 
RAPAuction outperforms all the algorithms in all cases and on average is 21, 26, 
11, and 286 times faster than ERELAXG, RWOA, SIMPLX, and CVX respectively. 
Both ERELAXG and RAP Auction use E-scaling but ERELAXG has a bigger duality 
gap than RAPAuction for the same E which implies that it needs more scaling phases 
to achieve the same accuracy as RAPAuction. The behavior of RWOA is typical of 
coordinate descent algorithms. It makes rapid progress in the beginning but suffers 
a slow convergence. 
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Table 5.1: Solution times (in seconds) for randomly generated sym-
metric ( N = M) search problems where N , M and A are the number 
of sources, sinks and arcs, respectively. 
. . 
0.9- 1.2 
0.9- 1.5 
0.5- 1.5 
0.288 8.199 
0.293 10.804 
0.263 9.897 
6.184 
6.616 
4.916 
5.426 941.41 
4.919 916.77 
4.458 952.83 
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Chapter 6 
Extensions of RAP Auction 
6.1 Generalized RAP 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we have analyzed and presented different algorithms for solving 
the equality constrained RAP without shipping costs. In this section, we allow for 
non-zero shipping costs on the arcs and relax the equality constraint on the sources. 
With non-zero shipping costs, forcing the source to allocate all their resources may 
actually be detrimental to overall performance. This is the Generalized RAP as 
formulated in Section 2.1. 
subject to 
jET {i,j}E£ 
L Xij ::; Si 
jE7i 
L CijXij = Zj 
iEW; 
X;::: 0, Z;::: 0 
(6.1a) 
ViEW (6.1b) 
V jET (6.1c) 
(6.1d) 
where W is the set of source nodes each with supply si, Tis the set of sink nodes 
each with non-increasing concave utility /j , Cij and aij are non-negative gains and 
shipping costs on arcs. 
With the introduction of shipping costs, there are no acyclic optimal solutions as 
shown in Proposition 2.2. This violates the fundamental assumptions of the SIMPLX 
algorithm [Washburn, 1995] which was the second best algorithm in our tests in 
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Chapter 5. 
For the generalized RAP, E-CS is defined as: 
Definition 6.1 Given E 2: 0, a flow-price quartet (x, z, J.L, p) is said to satisfy E-CS 
ifx 2: 0, z 2: 0, J.L 2: 0, and 
V{i,j}E£ 
J-li :S CijPj - aij + E \1 { i, j} E £ with Xij > 0 
Pj E -8/j(zj) \1 jET 
J-li = 0 \1 i with 2::::::: Xij < Si 
jET;_ 
(6.2a) 
(6.2b) 
(6.2c) 
(6.2d) 
We call the first three conditions ((6.2a), (6.2b) and (6.2c)) as partial t:-CS. ~:-CS 
for the equality constrained RAP, (5.1), can be obtained from the partial E-CS by 
setting the shipping costs to zero. Here we have one additional condition (6.2d) at 
the sources which says that sources can have surpluses if their prices are at zero. In 
all our previously proposed algorithms, sources bid to exhaustion and this has to be 
modified. With tllis definition for E-CS, Proposition 3.1 which bounds the duality gap 
can be rederived as follows: 
Proposition 6.1 Let (x*, z*, J.L*, p *) be a flow price quartet satisfying t:-CS such that 
(x*, z*) is primal feasible, then 
0 ::; f(x*) - q(J.L*, p *) ::; E s'1 (6.3) 
where the dual function q is defined in (2.4). 
Proof: From weak duality and the fact that (x*, z*, J.L*, p*) satisfies partial ~:-CS, 
we have 
0::; f(x*)- q(J.L*, p *) = J.L*'s- p*'z* + 2::::::: aijx;j. 
{i,j}EE 
Since (J.L*, x*) satisfies (6.2d), we have 
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So 
This along with the fact that (x*, z*) is primal feasible gives 
f(x*) - q(J.L*, p*) = L 11; L x;,j- LPj L CijX;j + L aijx;j 
iEW jET; jET iEWj {i,j}EE 
- L L(Jl;- CijPj + aij)x;j 
iEW jET; 
< ELL x;j :=:::; E s'l. 
iEW jET; 
• 
The introduction of shipping cost makes has one fundamental impact on the struc-
ture of RAP. It introduces new type of cycles. Without shipping costs, Lemma 3.2 
showed that only flow generating cycles can exist in the admissible graph Q. This 
was crucial for the proving the finite time termination of RAP Auction in Chapter 
3 and Distributed RAP Auction in Chapter 4. Now with shipping costs, apart from 
being flow generating or absorbing, cycles can have positive or negative cost . We first 
define the cost of a cycle C as 
ac = L lei aii - L lei aij · 
(i,j)EC+ (i,j)EC-
Note that it 's not just the sum of all the costs along the arcs in the cycle. The 
cost incurred by a b-flow push along a cycle is acb. We now show that cycles in 
admissible graph can either be flow generating or flow absorbing with negative cost 
in the following lemma which can be seen as a generalization of Lemma 3.2. 
Lemma 6.1 Cycles in admissible graph are either flow generating, or flow absorbing 
with negative cost. 
Proof: Let C be one such cycle in Q where C = (i1 , j 1,i2, ... ,jm = Jo,i1). Note 
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that every source has two arcs in the admissible graph: a forward arc ( ik, j k) and a 
reverse arc (ik,jk_1). This implies for V k = 1, .. . , m 
This can be rearranged as 
m equations one for each source. Multiplying each source equation with 'Ycik and 
summing them 
m 
ac - 2::) aikik - aikik-1 hcik 
k=1 
m 
< ,I) cikikPik - cikik-1Pik-1 hcik 
k=1 
m 
L(cikikPik- Cikik-1Pik-1hcik 
k=1 
m m-1 
L 'Ycik cikikPik - L 'Ycik cikikPik - cid=Pi"' 
k=1 k=1 
'Yci"' Ci=i=Pi= - cid=Pi"' 
If 'Yc < 1, then ac < 0 as prices and gains are non negative. So either the cycle is 
flow generating or flow absorbing with negative cost. • 
This shows pushing flow in cycles either increases flow which reduces the nonlinear 
costs at sinks or it reduces the shipping costs on the arcs. 
We now generalize the proposed algorithms for Generalized RAP. Note that the 
algorithms presented until now preserved E-CS and (6.1c) in every iteration and ter-
minated with primal feasibility. The modified algorithms will preserve partial E-CS 
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and (6.1c) and terminate with (6.2d) and primal feasibility. Apart from introducing 
shipping costs in the relevant equations, there are two qualitative changes: 
1. Source don't have to bid to exhaustion. With positive shipping costs, the set of 
optimal feasible solutions may not even contain such a solution where all source 
surpluses are at zero. (6.2d) suggests that source can stop bidding once their 
prices become zero. · 
2. The admissible graph may have flow absorbing or generating cycles. Flows 
absorbing cycles have to be handled appropriately. 
6.1.1 RAP Auction 
The finite time convergence for this algorithm depends critically on the cycles being 
flow generating. Such cycles can only have finitely many circulations before one of 
the arcs gets saturated. This does not hold true for flow absorbing cycles as they can 
have infinite circulations as illustrated in Fig. 6·1. To preempt this possibility, we 
w T 
Figure 6·1: Infinite circulations in flow absorbing cycle. Let 9~ be the 
initial surplus at source 1, xg1 and x~2 be initial flows on the reverse 
Aft k . 1 . h k o o o k-1 I arcs. er ~ c1rcu at10ns, we ave 91 = lc91 , x21 = x21 - 91/c c11 c21 
and x12 = x~2 - 9~1~· For /c < 1 and large enough xg1 and x~2 , we can 
have infinite circulations. 
allow sources to bid only if their surpluses are large enough. With this condition, we 
can see that the cycles such as in Fig. 6·1 can only have finitely many circulations. 
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To do this, we slightly modify the definition of E-CS by replacing (6.2d) with 
(6.4) 
With this modified definition, we have a slight increase in the duality gap as shown. 
Proposition 6.2 Let (x* , z* , J.L*, p*) be a flow price quartet satisfying E-CS such that 
(x*, z*) is primal feasible, then 
0:::; f(x*)- q(J.L*, p*) :::; E (s' + 1')1. (6.5) 
Proof: From weak duality and the fact that (x*, z*, J.L*, p*) satisfies partial E-CS, 
we have 
0:::; f(x*)- q(J.L*, p*) = J.L*'s- p*'z* + L aijx;j . 
{i,j}EE 
Since (J.L*, x*) satisfies (6.4), we have 
J.L*'s:::; L 11; L x;,j + NE. 
iEW jET; 
This along with the fact that (x* , z*) is primal feasible gives 
iEW jET; 
< E L L x;j + N E :::; E ( s' + 1') 1. 
iEW jET; 
As before, in this algorithm source prices are implicitly defined as 
ViEW. 
• 
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Bidding Phase: 
Select a source i E W with J.Li9i > E; if no such source can be found , the algorithm 
terminates. 
Step 1: (Select best sink) Compute the current value vii = ciiPi- aij of each sink 
jET;. Find a sink j 1 offering the best value 
Vbest = max Vij, 
jE7i 
and a sink j 2 offering second best value 
{ 
maxkE'Ti\i1 vii 
Vsec = 
-aii 
!Til ;::: 2 
else 
Step 2: (Compute bid price): Compute i's bid price for j 1 as 
Step 3: (Submit bid) Submit the bid { ciii9i, b} to sink j 1 . 
There is no change in the allocation phase which means that simply by introducing 
shipping costs into Proposition 3.2, we can show that partial E-CS, (6.1c), and non-
negative source surpluses are invariants. Similarly, Lemma 3.1, which proves that 
flows can't be reversed without a price drop of at least Ernin price drop holds. Although 
Lemma 3.2 no longer holds, by allowing only sources with sufficiently large surplus 
to bid during the bidding phase, we have only finite number of circulations in any 
type of cycle. With this result, rest of the analysis is unchanged to prove Lemma 3.3 
and finally Proposition 3.3 as these results are based on the analysis of the allocation 
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phase which is essentially unchanged. 
6.1.2 Distributed RAP Auction 
Along the same lines, the bidding procedure of the distributed RAP Auction of Chap-
ter 4 is modified for generalized RAP: permit only sources with sufficient surpluses 
to bid and introduce shipping costs in the computations of values and bid prices. So 
the definition of the set U(t) is modified to be a set of all sources with !Li(t)gi(t) > E. 
Any source in U(t) uses the following bidding procedure. 
Bidding Procedure: 
Step 1: (Select best sink) Compute the current value Vij = cikPk(Tij(t))- aij of 
each sink j E T;. Find a sink j 1 offering the best value 
Vbest = max Vij, jET; 
and a sink )2 offering second best value 
{ 
maxkET;\j1 Vij 
Vsec = 
-aij 
!Til;::: 2 
else 
Step 2: (Compute bid price): Compute i's bid price for j 1 as 
Step 3: (Submit bid) Submit the bid {Yi(t), b(t)} to sink j 1 and set gi(t + 1) = 0 
where Yi(t) = Cijgi(t). 
The allocation procedure is unchanged which allows all the analysis of termination 
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to be valid. 
6.1.3 Polynomial RAP Auction 
Polynomial RAP auction has built in cycle detection. In fact, in reverse auction, 
where cycles were flow absorbing, we should have to handle them. So we no longer 
need to restrict sources with small surpluses from bidding. So we revert back to the 
original definition of E-CS (6.2) here. However, we do have to restrict sources with 
zero price from bidding and have to generalize flow pushes in cycles once they are 
detected for both forward and reverse auctions. 
We first redefine active and inactive arcs by introducing shipping costs in (5.2) and 
(5.3) as for any E > 0, any (3 E (0, 0.5), and flow-price quartet (x, z, p, , p) satisfying 
E-CS, we say that an arc ( i, j) E £ is (3 -best if 
and (3-worst if 
Forward Auction 
Recall that for forward auction, the admissible graph is defined as 
Q = {(i, J)I(i,j) E £is {3-best} U {(j, i)l(i,j) E £is (3-worst}. 
For this graph, we can perform identical analysis as in Lemma 6.1 to show that cycles 
may be flow absorbing or generating. So we have to modify the bidding phase to 
handle flow absorbing cycles. When such a cycle is found, flow is pushed till either 
the cycle saturates or the source is exhausted whichever happens earlier. 
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Bidding Phase: 
Select a source i E W with f..Li9i > 0; if no such source can be found, the bidding 
phase terminates. 
Step 1: (Choose a ,8-best arc) If the bid list .c+(i) is empty, go to Step 2. 
Otherwise, choose any ,8-best arc, say (i, j). Check if this arc is still ,8-best, else 
remove it from the bid list and restart Step 1. If this arc belongs to some cycle C of 
the admissible graph Q, go to Step 3b. Otherwise go to Step 3a. 
Step 2: (Update price of source i) Drop f..Li to the level 
and populate the push list of i. If f..Li9i > 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3a: (Bid for sink j) Increase Xij by gi, set 9i = 0 and set the bid price of this 
flow to 
if l£+(i)l > 1 
else 
where 
{
maxkE7i\i cikPk- aik if l7i\il > 0 
Vsec = 
-aij else 
Run allocation phase at sink j. Check if (i, j) is still active, else remove it from .c+(i) . 
Now if .c+(i) = 0 go to Step 2. If f..Li9i > 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3b: (Push 8-flow along cycle C), where 
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Update 9i = gi + (!c- 1)8, if /-Li9i > 0 then go to Step 1. 
The only change in the allocation phase is the introduction of shipping costs in (5. 7) 
as 
This new forward auction has all the properties of the original except that not all 
flows pushes in cycles are saturated. If the cycle is flow absorbing and the surplus 
is small, it can be non saturating flow push. So in Proposition 5.1 while the bound 
on number of saturated cycle flow pushes continues to be 2A, we have to bound the 
number of non saturating flow pushes in cycles. Between changes in admissible graph, 
there can be at most N flow pushes in cycles as non saturating flow pushes in cycles 
are exhausting. Since the graph can change at most (2A + MC / (3) times, we have 
the bound on total number of non saturated cycle flows pushes as N ( 2A + M C / (3). 
Reverse Auction 
For reverse auction, the admissible graph is defined as 
Q = {(i,j)l(j,i) E £is (3-best} U {(i, j)l(i,j) E £is (3-worst}. 
With respect to forward auction, the role of forward and reverse arcs is switched. The 
bidding phase of reverse auction can be derived along the same lines by introducing 
shipping costs in appropriate equations and generalizing flows pulls from cycles. One 
deviation is that sources with deficits continue to bid irrespective of their prices. 
Bidding Phase: 
Select a source i E W with 9i < 0; if no such source can be found, the bidding phase 
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terminates. 
Step 1: (Choose a ,8-worst arc) If the bid is list .c-(i) is empty, go to Step 2. 
Otherwise, choose any ,8-worst arc, say ( i, j). Check if this arc is still ,8-worst, else 
remove it from the bid list and restart Step 1. If this arc belongs to some cycle C of 
the admissible graph Q, go to Step 3b. Otherwise go to Step 3a. 
Step 2: (Update price of source i) Raise J.li to the level 
and populate the bid list of i. If gi < 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3a: (Bid for sink j) Decrease Xij by 8 where 8 = min{ -gi, Xij }, increase gi 
by 8, and set the bid price of this flow to 
else 
where 
{
minkE{7i\ilxik>O} cikPk- aik + E if l{'li\jlxik > O}l > 0 
Vsec = 
CijPma:x. - aij else 
Here Pma:x. ~ maxjETinf Pi. Run allocation phase at sink j which now has deficit 
gi = -Cij8. Check if (i,j) is still,B-worst, else remove it from .c-(i). Now if .c-(i) = 0 
go to Step 2. If gi < 0 go to Step 1 else exit. 
Step 3b: (Push 8-deficit along cycle C), where 
if 'Yc ~ 1 
if 'Yc < 1 
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Update gi = gi + (1 -!c)o. If gi < 0, go to Step 1. 
The only change in the allocation phase is the introduction of shipping costs in (5.11) 
as 
Proposition 5.3 was based on application of generalized conformal realization the-
orem. This theorem assumes equality constraints at all nodes. We now show how 
with a slight modification, we can continue using this theorem. 
Proposition 6.3 Let e be any nonnegative scalar such that the initial source price 
vector J-t0 for RAP Auction satisfies BE-GS together with some feasible flow vector 
x 0 and price vector p 0 . Then, forward and reverse RAP Auction perform at most 
((B + 1)r- 1)/(3 price drops and ((B + 1)(2f- 1))/(3 price rises at each source. 
Proof: For the given feasible flow x 0 , there maybe a set of sources W 0 with 
positive surpluses which is allowed due to the inequality constraints at the sources. 
For the sake of analysis, we can remove these surpluses by assuming that they are 
allocated to a dummy sink M + 1 connected to all the sources through arcs of unit 
gain and zero shipping costs. The cost function for this sink is fM+l( z ) = 0. So its 
price PM+l is always zero. This dummy sink allows equality constraints at all nodes. 
Also from (6.2d), the prices of all the sources in W 0 are all zero. 
Consider the flow-price triple (x, J-t, p) at the beginning of a forward iteration. For 
this flow, assume XiM+l = 0 for all i. We trivially have for all i E W 0 , f.Li = 11? = 0 
as prices can only drop during forward auction. So no price drops are possible at 
these sources. We account for the price drops at W\ W 0 by applying the conformal 
realization theorem x 0 - x as before. Also note that shipping costs have no impact 
on the analysis as they cancel out in (5.13) and (5.14). 
Now lets consider the impact during reverse auction. Any source with a deficit by 
definition has no allocation to the dummy sink. Hence dummy sink and arcs incident 
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on it can be completely ignored during the analysis. • 
6. 2 Reoptimization 
In this section we consider a dynamic version of RAP where we allow arrival and de-
parture/failure of nodes and links. Given the new network topology, we can solve this 
as an entirely new problem starting from E0-CS feasible flow price triple (x0 , /Lo, p 0 ) 
(generated using (5.18) and (5.19) ). However this entirely discards the current solu-
tion (E"-CS feasible flow price triple (xc, /Lc , pc)) . We now show how using different 
tools we have already developed, we can handle different changes in the network by 
reoptimizing from the current solution. We denote the current and new graph as 
(We' rc' £C) and (W' T, E)' respectively. 
• New sources: A set of sources W\Wc along with arcs connecting them to dif-
ferent sinks are added. In this case, we can simply run the the forward RAP 
auction with E = E" , starting from 
(6.6) 
if (i,j) E £C 
else 
and p0 = pc. We can also start E-Scaling with starting from (:x0 , jL0 , p0 ) with 
large enough E0 . Increasing the total supply in a given RAP increases the sink 
demands while lowering sink prices. So we have 
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and 
where p,* and p* denotes the final source and sink prices for the new problem, 
respectively. 
• Sink failures: Sources which had allocated to these sinks Tc\ T recall their flows 
and now have a surplus. This situation is similar to the above. We don't even 
have to set the source prices. 
• Source failures: Removal of source leave deficit at sinks. These deficits can be 
transferred to the sources using the following routine. 
Deficit transfer routine: 
For each sink jET with 9i < 0: 
- Compute Pi = miniEWj (P,i + aii) / cii and let i denote any one of the ar-
guments this minimization. This is an c-CS satisfying upper bound on 
Pi· 
- Raise pnce: Pi = min{pi, ei(zi + 9i)} while withdrawing flow ~z = 
min{ -gi , zi - <I>i(Pi)}. So the demands reduces to zi = zi - ~z and 
9i = 9i + D.z. If 9i is zero, exit. 
- Transfer deficit to source i: Increase xii by -gifcii' set 9i = 9i- 9i/Cii and 
9i = 0. 
Now we can either run the reverse auction with c = E or start c-scaling with 
c0 large enough. In this case, we can't claim any advantage of starting for the 
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suggested solution rather than from (x0 , J1°, p 0 ) as reducing the total supply in 
a given RAP decreases the sinks demands while raising their prices. So we have 
and 
• New sinks: We can assume that these new sinks start with their prices at zero 
and 8j(O) deficit. Now we can run the deficit transfer routine to shift the deficit 
to sources. So this scenario can be handled like above. 
In general, we may have a combination of these changes simultaneously. For this we 
propose the following routine: 
Reoptimization 
Step 1: Compute source prices using (6.6). 
Step 2: Set new sink prices to zero. 
Step 3: Transfer sink deficits to sources. 
Step 4: Start €-scaling with sufficiently large c0 . 
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Chapter 7 
Auction for Nonlinear Min Cost Flow 
7.1 Introduction 
Network flow problems with network constraints and convex arc costs arise in a variety 
of applications, such as power distribution in hydroelectric power systems (Rosenthal, 
1981], pipe flow analysis (Keady, 1987], data communications (Gallager, 1977], trans-
portation networks (Florian, 1986], and finance (Mulvey, 1987]. In such problems, the 
overall performance is a separable function of the flows on each arc, and the feasi-
ble flows are constrained by conservation of flow and network topology. This class 
of problems include the standard network flow optimization problems with linear arc 
costs and capacity constraints, as well as problems with nonlinear, convex arc costs or 
nonlinear arc costs. A survey of algorithm approaches for solution of these techniques 
can be found in (Dembo et al., 1989]. 
Algorithms based onE-relaxation and auction/sequential shortest path algorithms 
(ASSP) are among the fastest techniques for solving network flow problems. These 
methods have their roots in the success of auction algorithms for linear assignment and 
transportation problems (Bertsekas, 1992, Bertsekas and Castanon, 1989). Initially 
they were developed for linear network flow problems (Bertsekas and Eckstein, 1988]. 
Polymenakos (Bertsekas et al., 1997] in his dissertation generalized these techniques 
for nonlinear ordinary networks (networks without gain) and shared Fortran routines 
named ERELAX and ASSP based on E-relaxation and auction/sequential shortest 
path, respectively. These methods were found to be 3 times faster than existing 
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fast techniques such as than primal-dual relaxation methods [Bertsekas et al., 1987]. 
Apart from their speed, they also work for non-differentiable or/and non-strictly 
convex cost functions and are one of the better suited algorithms for parallel and 
distributed computation. Later Tseng [Tseng and Bertsekas, 2000] extended them 
to generalized networks (networks with gain) and publicly shared a Fortran routine 
ERELAXG and ASSPG which were demonstrated to be one of the fastest techniques 
for both nonlinear ordinary and generalized networks in [Guerriero and Tseng, 2002]. 
In this chapter, we analyze the qualitative behavior of the €-relaxation algorithm 
for convex costs and identify situations which can slow down the algorithm consider-
ably because it is forced to take very small steps in approaching an optimal solution. 
This behavior is unique to the nonlinear version, and is not present when the costs 
are linear. We then propose a modification to €-relaxation to remove this behavior 
using concepts inspired by the auction algorithm for assignment problems [Bertsekas, 
1992, Bertsekas and Castanon, 1989]. Like the auction algorithm and our recently 
proposed RAP Auction algorithm for nonlinear resource allocation, our improved €-
relaxation algorithm uses the second best price/information to take aggressive steps. 
We refer to the new algorithm as the accelerated €-relaxation. We show that this 
algorithm has same the computational complexity as the original E-relaxation algo-
rithm. Our empirical simulations in solving large numbers of random problems show 
that the accelerated E-relaxation algorithm outperforms the original algorithm. Our 
analysis and solution approach are equally applicable to developing accelerated ASSP 
algorithm [Bertsekas et al. , 1996,Guerriero and Tseng, 2002]. In this chapter , we focus 
on the exposition of the accelerated €-relaxation algorithms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 first formu-
lates the convex cost network flow problem and then briefly describes the original 
€-relaxation algorithm. In section 7.3, we study the qualitative performance of E-
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relaxation and identify a potential computation bottleneck. To tackle this bottleneck 
and improve performance, we develop the accelerated €-relaxation algorithm for or-
dinary networks in section 7.4 and establish its correctness and its computation com-
plexity. The algorithm for generalized networks is developed in Section 7.5. In Section 
7.6, we report our numerical experiments on different classes of standard problems. 
We conclude our discussion in 7.7. 
7.2 The E-relaxation Algorithm 
The separable convex cost network flow problem is defined as 
min L fij(Xij) 
(i ,j)EA 
s.t. L Xij - L 'YkiXki = si, V i E N, 
{jl(i,j)EA} {ki(k,i)EA} 
xij E xij, v (i, j) E A, 
where x = {xijl(i,j) E A} is a flow vector in a given directed graph (N,A) , si are 
given supply scalars, "/ij > 0 is the arc gain, Xij are nonempty intervals of scalars 
[bij, Cij] and each fij : Xij H ~is convex cost function. We assume that there exists 
a set of flows Xij, ( i, j) E A that satisfy the constraints above, so this problem is 
feasible. 
Ordinary networks are networks with "/ij = 1 for all ( i, j) E A whereas networks 
with non unity gains are called generalized networks. The algorithms for generalized 
networks have additional complication of detecting and dealing with cycles which can 
generate or absorb flow. Hence for simplicity, we will develop our ideas for ordinary 
networks and later described how they can be extended for generalized networks. So 
from here onwards, we omit arc gains "/ij. 
By introducing a Lagrange multiplier Pi for the flow conservation equation at each 
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node i, we can obtain the dual of this problem [Bertsekas et al., 1997]. We refer to Pi 
as the price of node i, and to the vector p = {Pili EN} as the price vector. 
E-relax:ation is an approximate primal dual technique based on dual coordinate 
ascent methods. Unlike primal dual techniques, it only maintains approximate com-
plementary slackness (CS) as opposed to CS. This approximate CS is called E-CS and 
defined as: 
Definition 7.1 Given E 2:: 0, a flow-price vector pair { x, p} is said to satisfy E-CS if 
for all arcs ( i, j), we have Xij E Xij and 
(7.1) 
where fij and fS denote the left and right derivative functions for fij. By convention 
fij(aij) = -oo and fij(bij) = oo. 
This is visualized in Fig. 7·1 as an E wide cylindrical region around the characteristic 
curve which is defined as 
For any flow-price vector pair (x,p) and for any node i, the marginal cost of 
pushing flow on a forward arc ( i, j) is 
while that of withdrawing flow on a reverse arc (j, i) is 
Given any flow-price vector pair (x,p) satisfying E-CS, we say that an arc (i, j) is 
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Figure 7·1: Visualization of t:-CS, active arcs, inactive arcs and flow 
margin. The thick curve is the characteristic curve. The cylindrical 
region of t: width represents the flow-price differential pairs ( xii, Pi -
Pi) that satisfy t:-CS. The upper and lower grey strips represent flow-
price differential pairs corresponding to an active and inactive arcs, 
respectively. The flow margin is also illustrated for a pair (xii,Pi- Pi)· 
active if 
and is inactive if 
In Fig. 7·1, (i,j) is active arc if (xii,Pi-Pi) belongs to the upper grey strip while if it 
belongs to the lower grey strip, then it is an inactive arc. The active and inactive arcs 
belong to the candidate lists of their starting and ending nodes, respectively. Denote 
by L(i) the candidate list of i. For an active (respectively, inactive) arc (i,j), the 
supremum of {J for which 
(respectively, Pi -Pi ::; fij(xii - 6)) is called the flow margin, {Jii (respectively, <5ii), 
124 
of the arc. The surplus at a node is defined as 
9i = Si - I: Xij + L Xki· 
{jl(i,j)EA} {kl(k,i)EA} 
The €-relaxation method starts with a flow-price vector pair (x,p) satisfying E-
CS. The method comprises of two phases: first phase is performed on nodes with 
positive surplus while second phase is for nodes with negative surplus. Note that 
for ordinary networks, it is not necessary to have both the phases. It is sufficient 
to have either one of the two phases as in the publicly available routine ERELAX 
where only the first phase is implemented. ERELAXG, which is orders of magnitude 
faster than ERELAX for ordinary network flow problems, uses both phases in an 
implementation known as surplus scaling. In this scheme except for the last £-scaling 
phase, only nodes whose surplus exceeds some threshold, say w > 0, are iterated 
upon. In the first phase, only up iterations are performed so as to adjust (x,p) until 
no node has surplus greater than w. In the second phase, only down iterations are 
performed so as to adjust (x,p) until no node with surplus less than -w remains . 
. This threshold w is gradually reduced to zero with each scaling phase. 
€-relaxation method 
Initialization: Choose E > 0 and any E-CS satisfying flow-price pair (x,p) Fix any 
scalar() E (0, 1) and w > 0. 
First phase: Repeatedly choose a node i with positive surplus gi and adjust ( x, p) 
by doing an up iteration at node i, until all nodes have surplus less than w. 
Second phase: Repeatedly choose a node i with negative surplus gi and adjust (x,p) 
by doing a down iteration at node i, until all nodes have surplus greater than -w. 
E-Scaling. If E is below a desired tolerance, terminate. Otherwise, scale E and w by 
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a fixed fraction and adjust the arc flows to satisfy E-CS. If this is the penultimate 
scaling phase, then set w to zero. Return to First phase. 
The up iterations from a node i with positive surplus change the flows and prices 
as follows. 
Up Iterations from i 
Step 1. If the candidate list L(i) = 0, go to Step 2. Otherwise, choose an arc, say a, 
from L(i), and go to Step 3. 
Step 2. Perform a price rise on node i. A price rise increases the price Pi by the max-
imum amount that maintains E-CS, while leaving flows and other prices unchanged. 
Exit. 
Step 3 . Perform a 8-fiow push along arc a, where 
A 8-flow push increases (respectively, decreases) Xij by 8 if a = ( i, j) (respectively, 
(j, i)), while leaving all node prices and all other flows unchanged. Exit. 
At any iteration, denote the admissible graph as Q = (N, A*) where the arc set 
A* contains all candidate list arcs oriented in the direction of flow change. Hence, 
incoming arcs to node i in its candidate list, L(i), are shown as reversed in the 
admissible graph while outgoing arcs retain their orientation. The correctness and 
complexity analysis of E-relaxation are based on two fundamental properties of up 
iterations: 
1. Preservation of E-CS. This is the invariant for primal dual iteration. A price-
126 
flow vector pair that satisfies E-CS and primal feasibility is guaranteed to be 
nearly optimal and this is achieved at termination. 
2. Prices are monotonically nondecreasing and each price rise is at least (1 - O)t:. 
This ensures that the admissible graph remains acyclic, given that it was initially 
acyclic, and bounds the number of price rises. 
A down iteration at a node i with gi < 0 is defined analogously to an up it-
eration, but with "active" and "inactive" switched and with "increase" and "de-
crease" switched. In addition, "up", "rise", "g/' are replaced by, respectively, "down", 
"drop", "-g/'. It also has the analogous fundamental properties as the up iterations. 
To obtain sharper complexity bound and performance, one uses a sweep imple-
mentation [Bertsekas et al., 1997] to determine the order in which nodes are selected 
during an up or down iteration. This implementation picks the nodes with the suc-
cessor order implied by the admissible graph, so that nodes that exhaust their surplus 
do not acquire additional surplus subsequently as part of an iteration. The resulting 
complexity of the algorithm is 0 ( K N 3 ), where K is the number of E scaling phases 
used in the algorithm. 
7.3 Qualitative Analysis of E-relaxation 
The linear version of E-relaxation can be recovered by realizing that 
where aij E R is the linear cost. Hence, it may seem that the nonlinear and linear 
version are very similar and should share similar behavior. However one big difference 
between the two versions is the definition of flow margin. As shown in Fig. 7·1, for 
nonlinear costs, flow margin depends on the flow-price differential ( Xij, Pi - Pi), fij 
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and E. For a linear problem, flow margin simplifies to 
{
Cii - Xii 
flow margin = 
Xii- bii 
( i, j) is active 
( i, j) is inactive 
It only depends on Xii and not on price differential Pi - Pi, Iii or E as illustrated in 
Fig. 7·2 
A 
----<j>----------
1 
aij 1--......... ------t rij 
: I 
----..-----------~ 
Flow Margin 
Figure 7·2: Visualization of flow margin on an active arc with linear 
cost. 'A' corresponds to a given flow-price differential pair (xii,Pi- Pi) 
at which flow margin is being computed. 
To appreciate the impact of this difference, we study the performance of linear 
and nonlinear €-relaxation on a simple network of two nodes shown in Fig. 7·3. Fig. 
Figure 7-3: Sample Problem: Network of two nodes. Here si = -si = 
Cii· 
7·4 illustrates €-relaxation in action if the cost is linear. The algorithm terminates 
after 2 iterations. For nonlinear cost, Fig. 7·5 illustrates the iterations taking place. 
The number of iterations is inversely proportional to c 1 and for twice differentiable 
cost function it is directly proportional to the curvature of the cost function. Hence 
the performance deteriorates as E gets smaller during E-scaling and the cost functions 
have larger curvature (Note curvature of linear functions is 0). 
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e~----------~~c 
aij rij 
I 
A ---------------1 
bij Xij Cij 
Figure 7·4: Visualization of linear E-relaxation when applied problem 
in Fig. 7·3. Assume 'A' is the initialization point. In the first iteration, 
node i raises its price so that ( i, j) enters its candidate list. This cor-
responds to 'B'. In second iteration, it performs a saturated flow push 
on (i,j) to reach 'C'. Now the algorithm terminates. 
Figure 7·5: Visualization of nonlinear E-relaxation when applied prob-
lem in Fig. 7·3. Starting from point 'A', in the first two iterations, 
node i first raises price and then performs a saturated flow push to 
reach point 'C'. Notice that even though it was a saturated flow push, 
arc ( i, j) still has capacity ( Xij < Cij). In the next iteration, i again 
raises price so that ( i, j) re-enters its candidate list and then performs 
a saturated flow push. This sequence continues till node i has zero 
surplus. 
This phenomenon can also be viewed purely in terms of prices as in Fig. 7 ·6. This 
makes it look analogous to the inferior performance of E-relaxation when applied to 
linear assignment problem compared to the auction algorithm [Bertsekas, 1992]. E-
relaxation allows for only E size steps irrespective of the difference between the best 
and second best arcs. The auction algorithm uses of second best marginal cost to 
make aggressive price increments. 
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Figure 7·6: For a given bidding node, j 1 and j 2 denote the end nodes 
for the arcs with the lowest and second lowest, respectively, marginal 
costs. In the <:-relaxation, price of node i, Pi, is allowed to rise in steps 
of E. So we have a sequence of E price rises and saturated flow pushes 
on arc ( i, jr) till arc ( i, j 2 ) becomes the best. 
7.4 Accelerated E-relaxation 
Even though <:-relaxation has its roots in auction algorithm, it ignores the second best 
information. This results in a simpler but as illustrated a slower algorithm. In the 
previous chapters, we have successfully extended the use of second best information 
to resource allocation problems. We now propose a new step to the <:-relaxation 
algorithm which uses second best information to make more aggressive iterations. 
This step only comes into play when there is a wide separation between best and 
second best options as in Fig. 7·6 and the node surplus is more than the flow margin. 
Its is under these conditions that <:-relaxation suffers from slow performance. 
We firs~ redefine flow margin as a function of the node price, 8ij (p) (respectively, 
8ji (p)) , as the supremum of 8 for which 
for active arc (respectively, Pi-P::; fij(xij-8) for inactive arc). With this definition, 
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we can readily obtain the previously defined flows margins as: 
Accelerated Up Iterations from i 
Step 1. If the candidate list L( i) = 0, go to Step 2. Otherwise, choose any arc, say 
a, from L(i). If #L(i) > 1 or #L(i) = 1 and gi :::; 8a(Pi), go to Step 3 else go to Step 
4. 
Step 2. Perform a price rise on node i and exit. 
Step 3. Perform a 8-fiow push along arc a where 
Exit. 
Step 4 . Perform a 8-fiow push along arc a where 
where vi is the maximum price of i that maintains E-CS for all arcs except a i.e., 
A( i) \ a. If this set is empty, then set vi to some large value. This is followed by a 
price rise 
(7.2) 
Exit . 
For a given arc a, we call8a(vi) as the aggressive flow margin. The difference between 
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original flow margin ba (pi) and aggressive flow margin ba (Vi) is illustrated in Fig 7 · 7. 
Since vi ~ Pi , we have ba(vi) ~ ba(Pi)· Note the Step 4 is only used for the cases 
where the original E-relaxation algorithm would have resulted in a sequence of at least 
one saturated flow push (since 9i > ba(Pi)) and price rise (since #L(i) = 1). This 
step quickly summarizes in one iteration what several alternating iterations of Step 2 
and Step 3 achieve. 
Figure 7·7: Visualization of flow margin and aggressive flow margin 
for a forward arc ( i, j). 
The iterations of this new algorithm when applied to the problem of previous 
section are illustrated in Fig. 7·8. Now the algorithm terminates in two iterations as 
the linear counterpart. 
Now we show that these new up iterations continue to preserve the fundamental 
properties of the original E-relaxation up iterations. We only have to show that step 
4 if executed, maintains these properties. 
Lemma 7.1 At the end of step 4, we have a flow-price vector that satisfies c-CS. If 
there is a price rise, then it is at least (1 - e)c. 
Proof: Assume that the chosen arc is an active arc (i,j) and let (xij,Pi- Pi) 
and ( Xij, Pi -Pi) denote the flow-price differential pair before and after this iteration. 
All other flows and prices are unchanged and Pi > Pi, Xij > Xij. Step 4 has two parts, 
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--------------- rij 
c 
Figure 7·8: Visualization of proposed accelerated nonlinear E-
relaxation when applied problem in Fig. 7·3. vi is set to some very 
large value as there is no second arc. Like before starting from 'A' , 
we are at 'B' after the first iteration. In the second iteration, Step 4 
is executed. First saturated aggressive flow push saturates the arc to 
arrive at 'Cl'. At this point arc (i,j) violates E-CS. Now the price is 
raised to reach point 'C' and E-CS is satisfied again. 
aggressive flow push followed by a price rise. After the flow push, the flow-price 
differential pair (xii,ih- Pi) violates E-complementary slackness (7.1), as shown in 
Fig. 7·8. Also note that now the candidate list L(i) is empty. The price rise (7.2) 
immediately corrects this violation. if Pi + Jij ( Xii) + E :S vi, then trivially 
else 
(7.3) 
From the definition of aggressive flow margin, we have 
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Combining with (7.3), we get 
Hence we have c-CS on arc (i, j). From the definition of vi and the fact that Pi ::; vi, 
c-CS is preserved on all the other arcs. Analogous arguments can be made if the 
choose arc is inactive arc. 
Monotonicity of prices is obvious. As explained before, price is only raised when 
the candidate list becomes empty. When the candidate list is empty, the price rise is 
at least (1 - B)c by the same logic as it is for step 2. • 
Given that these properties are preserved by Step 4 and the fact that Step 4 
is only used when the original algorithm would have needed at least two iterations 
consisting of step 2 (price rise) and step 3 (saturated flow push), we conclude that the 
termination and complexity bounds of the original €-relaxation algorithm continue to 
hold. 
The down iterations at node i with 9i < 0 can be obtained from the up iteration 
in the same fashion as it was derived in section 7.2. 
7.5 Accelerated E-relaxation for generalized networks 
Algorithms in ordinary networks push flow from node to node till it reaches a sink 
node. In generalized networks, we can have cycles with non unity gains. These 
cycles can absorb or generate flows. Hence €-relaxation for generalized networks has 
additional steps to detect loops and if found, push flow in them. Since flows pushes 
in cycles involve several arcs and nodes, it is not possible to extend the ideas of 
aggressive flow pushes in them. Also empirically, we found that ERELAXG rarely 
performs such flow pushes in cycles. 
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Accelerated Up Iterations from i 
Step 1. If the candidate list L( i) = 0, go to Step 2. Otherwise, choose any arc active 
arc (i,j) or inactive arc (j, i) , say a, from L(i). If this arc belongs to some cycle C 
of Q whose forward arcs are all active and whose backward arcs are all inactive and 
if no price rise nor saturating nor accelerated flow push has been performed since the 
last up iteration at node j , go to Step 5. Otherwise, if #L( i) > 1 or #L( i) = 1 and 
9i ~ 8a(Pi) , go to Step 3 else go to Step 4. 
Step 2. Perform a price rise on node i and exit. 
Step 3. Perform a 8-fiow push along arc a where 
Exit. 
Step 4. Perform a 8-fiow push along arc a where 
where vi is the maximum price of i that maintains c-CS for all arcs except a. This is 
followed by a price rise 
Exit. 
Step 5. Perform a 8-fiow push along C, where 
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and Ck denotes the portion of C from i to k and 'Yck its gain. 'YC is the cycle gain. 
Exit. 
7.6 Simulations 
We have developed an Fortran code for implementing the accelerated €-relaxation 
algorithm of the previous section. The code is named ACC-ERELAXG is based 
on ERELAXG. Apart from the accelerated flow push step (Step 4), it differs from 
the original code in computation of candidate list during price rise. In ERELAXG, 
the candidate list and new price are computed in the same loop scanning all the 
incident arcs once. Hence, the candidate lists may not be complete. However in 
ACC-ERELAXG, we need to know if the candidate list is singleton or not to decide 
between accelerated or regular flow push. So we implement a two pass price rise. 
During the first pass the new price is determined. Given the price the candidate list 
is computed in the subsequent pass. Theoretically the complexity of price rise remains 
the same but empirically it is possible in some cases that ERELAXG is faster than 
ACC-ERELAXG due this additional loop in price rise. ACC-ERELAXG is available 
at http://iss.bu.edu/dac/dac/Software/Software.html. 
The comprehensive empirical performance of ERELAXG was reported in [Guer-
riero and Tseng, 2002]. We use the same benchmark problems, which consist of 
symmetric uncapacitated transportation problems and symmetric capacitated tran-
shipment problems. In these tests the nonlinear cost functions are set to be one of 
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the following: 
fij ( Xij) = atxij + a;jx;j quadratic, 
fij(Xij) = xrj/3(a;j) 2 pipe, 
fij(Xij) = Xij(log(x;j;a;j)- 1) entropy, 
fij ( Xij) = a}jxij + Xij / ( Cij - Xij) inverse. 
for some linear coefficients a}i E R and nonlinear coefficients ari E [ 0, oo). 
(7.4a) 
(7.4b) 
(7.4c) 
(7.4d) 
Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6, lists the solutions times on MacBook Pro 
4.1 running OS X 10.7.3 operating system. The codes were complied with GNU g77 
complier using the 0 option. Tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 were generated using identical 
parameters as used in [Guerriero and Tseng, 2002]. The first two tables correspond to 
the transportation and transshipment problems in generalized networks while last two 
correspond to those in ordinary problems. In tables 7.5 and 7.6, we have increased the 
range of the nonlinear parameter arj to illustrate the sensitivity of both algorithms 
to the curvature of cost functions. 
We can summarize the test results with the following observations: 
1. For solving generalized quadratic problems (tables 7.1 and7.2), ACC-ERELAXG 
consistently outperforms ERELAXG for all gain ranges. Specifically ACC-
ERELAXG is on average 1. 75 and 1.50 times faster than ERELAXG for trans-
portation and transhipment problems, respectively. 
2. For solving nonlinear problems (tables 7.3 and 7.4), ACC-RELAXG is nearly 
always faster than ERELAXG. On average ACC-ERELAXG is 1.22 and 1.17 
times faster than ERELAXG for transportation and transhipment problems, 
respectively. 
3. For solving ordinary quadratic problems with increased curvature (tables 7.5 
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and 7.6) w.r.t those in (tables 7.3 and 7.4), efficiency of ACC-RELAXG on 
average increases from 1.25 to 2.08 for quadratic transportation problems. For 
transshipment problems it increases from 1.38 to 1.67 on average. 
These simulations empirically demonstrate the superior performance of ACC-
ERELAXG. It outperforms ERELAXG in almost all cases and the performance gap 
widens as the curvature of the cost function increases. Interestingly the performance 
ACC-ERELAXG crudely parallels to ASSPG as reported in [Guerriero and Tseng, 
2002] where it is reported that ASSPG comprehensively outperforms ERELAXG in 
generalized networks while in ordinary networks it gets outperformed. 
7. 7 Conclusion 
Although €-relaxation is among the fastest algorithms for the solution of separable 
convex network minimization problems, we have identified conditions where its per-
formance can be slow. These conditions are similar to those encountered for linear 
assignment problems, and have been addressed successfully in those cases by auction-
type algorithms. We adapted concepts from the auction algorithm to develop an 
accelerated variation of E-relaxation that is considerably faster than the original E-
relaxation algorithm. We demonstrate that it has the same computation complexity 
as the original algorithm but empirically outperforms the original algorithm. 
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Table 7.1: Solution times (in seconds) for ERELAXG and ACC-
ERELAXG for solving quadratic cost symmetric uncapacitated gen-
eralized transportation problems with a}j E [1 , 1000] , a~j E [1 , 5] and 
Cij E [O,oo). 
. . 
0.9- 1.2 
0.9- 1.5 
0.5- 1.5 
81.260 
128.686 
3.523 
17.262 
28.388 
1.667 
30.748 
52.227 
2.113 
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Table 7.2: Solution times (in seconds) for ERELAXG and ACC-
ERELAXG for solving quadratic cost symmetric capacitated general-
ized transhipment problems with atj E [1, 1000], a~j E [1, 5) and capac-
ity E (50, 100). 
. . 
0.9- 1.2 
0.9-1.5 
0.5- 1.5 
154.26 
158.232 
6.897 
36.640 
50.857 
2.411 
45.561 
66.660 
2.964 
95.396 
88.106 
4.305 
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Table 7.3: Solution times (in seconds) for ERELAXG and ACC-
ERELAXG for solving nonlinear cost symmetric uncapacitated ordi-
nary transportation problems with a}i E [1, 1000], afi E [1, 5) and 
Cij E (O, oo). 
400 6000 0.024 0.027 
400 8000 0.037 0.034 
400 7000 0.033 0.031 
600 7000 0.038 0.033 
800 7000 0.054 0.040 
1600 16000 0.108 0.082 
1600 32000 0.196 0.149 
2000 70000 0.499 0.430 
3000 70000 0.561 0.482 
4000 70000 0.650 0.506 
400 6000 0.071 0.077 
400 8000 0.103 0.082 
400 7000 0.089 0.082 
600 7000 0.102 0.086 
800 7000 0.148 0.118 
1600 16000 0.312 0.287 
1600 32000 0.624 0.529 
2000 70000 1.658 1.416 
3000 70000 2.064 1.814 
4000 70000 2.815 2.370 
ntropy 
400 6000 0.082 0.059 
400 8000 0.100 0.088 
400 7000 0.065 0.061 
600 7000 0.079 0.058 
800 7000 0.074 0.056 
1600 16000 0.165 0.161 
1600 32000 0.540 0.458 
2000 70000 1.719 1.583 
3000 70000 1.651 1.556 
4000 70000 1.547 1.216 
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Table 7.4: Solution times (in seconds) for ERELAXG and ACC-
ERELAXG for solving nonlinear cost symmetric capacitated ordinary 
transhipment problems with aii E [1 , 1000], a;i E [1, 5) and capacity 
E (50, 100). 
400 6000 0.031 0.029 
400 8000 0.040 0.036 
400 7000 0.040 0.034 
600 7000 0.084 0.061 
800 7000 0.090 0.066 
1600 16000 0.173 0.149 
1600 32000 0.302 0.165 
2000 70000 0.582 0.352 
3000 70000 0.684 0.487 
4000 70000 0.833 0.565 
400 6000 0.068 0.059 
400 8000 0.102 0.081 
400 7000 0.076 0.078 
600 7000 0.090 0.089 
800 7000 0.133 0.120 
1600 16000 0.288 0.272 
1600 32000 0.685 0.593 
2000 70000 1.396 1.240 
3000 70000 1.765 1.564 
4000 70000 2.425 2.146 
ntropy 
400 6000 0.067 0.060 
400 8000 0.083 0.079 
400 7000 0.082 0.074 
600 7000 0.068 0.065 
800 7000 0.069 0.062 
1600 16000 0.196 0.170 
1600 32000 0.532 0.459 
2000 70000 1.724 1.677 
3000 70000 1.750 1.654 
4000 70000 1.621 1.505 
nverse 
400 6000 0.167 0.174 
400 8000 0.171 0.157 
400 7000 0.143 0.150 
600 7000 0.366 0.343 
800 7000 0.323 0.324 
1600 16000 0.744 0.709 
1600 32000 0.938 0.848 
2000 70000 1.741 1.985 
3000 70000 2.249 2.380 
4000 70000 3.942 3.381 
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Table 7.5: Solution times (in seconds) for ERELAXG and ACC-
ERELAXG for solving quadratic cost symmetric uncapacitated ordi-
nary transportation problems with a}i E (1 , 1000], ari E (1 , 50] and 
Cij E (O, oo). 
400 6000 0.088 0.045 
400 8000 0.074 0.042 
400 7000 0.072 0.042 
600 7000 0.192 0.076 
800 7000 0.318 0.142 
1600 16000 0.598 0.245 
1600 32000 0.351 0.206 
2000 70000 0.703 0.538 
3000 70000 1.135 0.560 
4000 70000 2.306 0.656 
Table 7.6: Solution times (in seconds) for ERELAXG and ACC-
ERELAXG for solving quadratic cost symmetric capacitated ordinary 
transhipment problems with a}i E (1 , 1000], ati E (1, 50] and capacity 
E (50, 100). 
400 6000 0.082 0.041 
400 8000 0.071 0.040 
400 7000 0.047 0.039 
600 7000 0.107 0.077 
800 7000 0.299 0.196 
1600 16000 0.595 0.266 
1600 32000 0.379 0.207 
2000 70000 0.653 0.499 
3000 70000 0.745 0.550 
4000 70000 1.117 0.653 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
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This thesis has successfully proposed auction based algorithms for solving classes of 
generalized nonlinear network flow problems. 
8.1 Resource allocation problems 
For the resource allocation problems, we have proposed a new class of algorithms from 
first principles for solving these problems in centralized and distributed environments. 
These algorithms exploit the underlying bipartite structure in these problems anal-
ogous to the auction algorithm for linear assignment problem. They are guaranteed 
to terminate with a near optimal solution for a wide class of non-increasing convex 
cost functions including non-continuous and/or non-differentiable functions . The cen-
tralized version of our algorithm, polynomial RAP Auction, has pseudo-polynomial 
complexity bounds and was demonstrated to be empirically superior to the existing 
state-of-art algorithms. We also illustrated how our algorithms can be extended for 
generalized resource allocation problem where there is non-zero shipping costs on the 
arcs and for the dynamic RAP where nodes may appear or disappear over time. 
While we have demonstrated the empirical performance of our algorithms through 
simulations, it will be desirable to implement them for real world applications such 
as for sensor management or multi-agent search problems with large number of local 
agents. 
Implementation of our distributed algorithm, distributed RAP Auction, was not 
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pursued and will be a fruitful area to explore. Our algorithms have fine-grained 
parallelism making them particularly well suited for implementations on GPU archi-
tectures. Here research is needed for establishing a protocol to detect termination in 
distributed RAP Auction. 
Research is also needed to see if polynomial complexity can be achieved for RAP 
Auction similar to what is available for very limited class of problems, i.e. , those with 
logarithmic cost functions [Devanur et al., 2008] [Orlin, 2010]. 
Finally, there are a large class of resources allocations problems with integer con-
straints such as Weapon-Target Assignment Problem [Ahuja et al., 2007]. These 
problems are usually solved using branch and bound technique where at each stage a 
relaxed problem which is a RAP is solved to give a lower bounds. We expect that a 
significant speed up will be achieved by using our polynomial RAP Auction algorithm 
for solving these RAPs. 
8.2 Nonlinear min-cost flow 
For the nonlinear min-cost flow problem in generalized network flow, we have success-
fully improved the performance of €-relaxation, current state-of-art , by incorporating 
ideas for auction algorithms. While second best information was used in auction al-
gorithm for aggressive price rises, we have shown how for nonlinear networks, it can 
be used for aggressive flow pushes and price rises simultaneous. This overcomes the 
bottlenecks in E-relaxation and hence enhances its performance. 
ASSP, another state-of-art algorithm, also suffers from similar bottlenecks as €-
relaxation and our ideas can be easily extended to improve the performance of ASSP 
for both ordinary and generalized networks. 
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Chapter 9 
Appendix 
9.1 Duality in differentiability of convex function and its con-
jugate 
The following theorem proves that the points where a given closed convex function is 
non-differentiable corresponds to linear segments of its conjugr.te function and vice-
versa as shown in Fig. 9·1. 
f(r) ~ IT I q(A) 
T -1 
Figure 9·1: Illustration of a sample function and its conjugate. Note 
that the points where t he function is non-differentiable correspond to 
linear segments of the conjugate function and vice-versa. 
Lemma 9.1 Iff : lR f----t ( -oo, oo] is a closed convex function that is not differentiable 
at some point f E llt, then its conjugate function q : lR f----t ( -oo, oo] 
q()..) = sup{TA - f(T)} 
TE~ 
is differentiable at all).. E u-(+)h, j+(+)) and \lq()..) = T. Similarly, if q is not 
differentiable at some .\, then 
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Proof: For A E (!-(f-), j+(f)), 
q- (A) min{ 71/+( 7) 2: A} 
> 7 
as V 7 < f, from (2.11) we have j+(7) :::; /-(f) <A. Similarly, 
< f 
as V 7 > f, f-(7) 2: j+(f) >A. From convexity of q, q-(A) :::; q+(A). So we get 
Conjugate of q is f. So the reverse argument follows from symmetry. • 
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